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ABSTRACT 
  A recurring, foundational issue for evidence-based regulation is 
deciding whether to extend governmental approval from an existing 
use with sufficient current evidence of safety and efficacy to a novel 
use for which such evidence is currently lacking. This “extrapolation” 
issue arises in the medicines context when an approved drug or device 
that is already being marketed is being considered (1) for new 
conditions (such as off-label diagnostic categories), (2) for new 
patients (such as new subpopulations), (3) for new dosages or 
durations, or (4) as the basis for approving a related drug or device 
(such as a generic or biosimilar drug). Although the logic of 
preapproval testing and the precautionary principle—first, do no 
harm—would counsel in favor of prohibiting extrapolation approvals 
until after traditional safety and efficacy evidence exists, such delays 
would unreasonably sacrifice beneficial uses. The harm of accessing 
unsafe products must be balanced against the harm of restricting 
access to effective products. In fact, the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA’s) current regulations in many ways reject the 
precautionary principle because they largely permit individual 
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physicians to prescribe medications for off-label uses before any 
testing tailored to those uses has been done.  The FDA’s approach 
empowers physicians, but overshoots the mark by allowing enduring 
use of drugs and devices with insubstantial support of safety and 
efficacy.  This Article instead proposes a more dynamic and evolving 
evidence-based regime that charts a course between the Scylla and 
Charybdis of the overly conservative precautionary principle on one 
hand, and the overly liberal FDA regime on the other.  
  Our approach calls for improvements in reporting, testing, and 
enforcement regulations to provide a more layered and nuanced 
system of regulatory incentives. First, we propose a more 
thoroughgoing reporting of off-label use (via the disclosure of 
diagnostic codes and “detailing” data) in manufacturers’ annual 
reports to the FDA, in the adverse event reports to the FDA, in 
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests, and, for a subset of 
FDA-designated drugs, in prescriptions themselves. Second, we would 
substantially expand the agency’s utilization of postmarket testing, 
and we provide a novel framework for evaluating the need for 
postmarket testing. Finally, our approach calls for a tiered labeling 
system that would allow regulators and courts to draw finer 
reimbursement and liability distinctions among various drug uses, 
and would provide the agency both the regulatory teeth and the 
flexibility it presently lacks. Together, these reforms would improve 
the role of the FDA in the informational marketplace underlying 
physicians’ prescribing decisions. This evolutionary extrapolation 
framework could also be applied to other contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recurring issue for evidence-based regulation of medicine is 
deciding whether to extend governmental approval from an existing 
use with sufficient current evidence of safety and efficacy to a novel 
use for which such evidence is currently lacking. This “extrapolation” 
issue can arise in four main contexts. First, “diagnosis extrapolation” 
occurs when physicians want to use an existing drug or device to treat 
a new condition (for example, using Seroquel to treat anxiety instead 
of schizophrenia). Second, “patient extrapolation” occurs when 
physicians want to use an existing drug or device to treat a new 
population with a given condition (for example, using Seroquel to 
treat children instead of adults). Third, “dosage extrapolation” occurs 
when physicians want to use an existing drug or device for a new 
duration or schedule of use, or at a new dosage (for example, using 
Seroquel indefinitely for schizophrenia when studies have only 
analyzed six weeks of use). Finally, “treatment extrapolation” occurs 
when physicians want to use a new drug or device that is related to an 
approved counterpart (for example, using extended-release Seroquel 
based on evidence that conventional Seroquel is safe and effective).1 
The logic of preapproval testing, and the precautionary 
principle—first, do no harm2—would counsel toward prohibiting 
extrapolation approvals until after traditional safety and efficacy 
evidence exists with regard to the subjects that match the diagnostic 
class, patient class, dosage class, and treatment class. Yet the Food 
and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) current regulations in many ways 
 
 1. Seroquel (Quetiapine Fumarate) Tablets: Full Prescribing Information, ASTRAZENECA, 
available at http://www1.astrazeneca-us.com/pi/Seroquel.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 2. HIPPOCRATES, OF THE EPIDEMICS bk. I, § 2(5) (Francis Adams trans., 2009).  
ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2014  8:34 PM 
380 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:377 
reject the precautionary principle because they allow individual 
physicians to prescribe medications for off-label uses before any 
testing tailored to those uses has been done. This Article charts a 
course between the Scylla and Charybdis of the overly conservative 
precautionary principle on one hand, and the overly liberal FDA 
regime on the other. We instead propose a more dynamic and 
evolving evidence-based regime. Just as probationary hiring can be 
dynamically efficient in the employment context,3 we argue that when 
ex ante due diligence is overly costly, a system that allows interim 
periods of use can provide physicians and patients greater treatment 
options while providing regulators with valuable evidence about the 
safety and efficacy of the proposed extrapolation. In contrast, a 
precautionary requirement—which would condition all approvals on 
pre-existing evidence for uses that constitute just slight extrapolations 
along any of these four dimensions—sacrifices probable short-term 
health benefits at the altar of precaution. Harm is not associated only 
with permitting access to unsafe products, but also with restricting 
access to beneficial products. The existing off-label regime captures 
the short-term benefits of extrapolation, but fails to sufficiently deter 
the long-term harms of perpetual prescribing into potentially 
hazardous off-label uses. 
This Article instead calls for improvements in reporting, testing, 
and enforcement regulations to provide a more layered and dynamic 
system of regulatory incentives. The first element of our proposal is to 
improve the reporting of the amount and effect of off-label 
extrapolations through a more comprehensive reporting of off-label 
use (via the disclosure of diagnostic codes and “detailing” data) in 
manufacturers’ annual reports to the FDA, in the adverse event 
reports to the FDA, in Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests, 
and, for a subset of FDA-designated drugs, in the prescriptions 
themselves. The agency could then disseminate the de-identified 
information4 it collects to allow third parties, such as academics, 
 
 3. For a discussion, see generally Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red 
Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 
1485 (1996); Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, Optimal Voting Rules for Two-
Member Tenure Committees, 36 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 323 (2011) (discussing academic 
tenure and, more generally, the practice of “up-or-out” hiring rules commonly found in law, 
business, and the military). 
 4. De-identified data has had individually identifiable health information removed so that 
it cannot be linked to a particular individual. Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: 
Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 255 
(2013). 
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insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and patient organizations, to 
complement its internal analyses. The second element of our proposal 
is the expansion of the FDA’s utilization of postmarket testing 
requirements with regard to off-label drug use, and we provide a 
novel framework for evaluating whether postmarket testing is 
necessary. 
Finally, the third element of our proposal is to create a tiered 
labeling system that would allow regulators and courts to draw finer 
reimbursement and liability distinctions. The FDA should create a 
category of “red box” warnings designed to completely prohibit 
certain off-label uses, require informed consent from patients for a 
subset of existing “black box” warnings, and create a category of 
“gray box” warnings to block Medicare Part D and Medicaid 
reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). Our labeling system could also be used to motivate 
pharmaceutical companies to comply with postmarket testing 
requirements using both sticks (the threat of boxed warnings with the 
attendant risk of tort liability) and carrots (a category of “conditional 
off-label use” that would allow limited promotion). The improved 
reporting, testing, and enforcement regulations would work together 
to produce a more layered range of regulatory responses. The FDA, 
armed with better information about the extent of off-label use and 
its adverse effects, would be in a better position to require postmarket 
testing and to discourage off-label use with new types of warnings if 
manufacturers failed to provide sufficient, timely evidence of safety 
and efficacy in that particular extrapolation. 
Our dynamic extrapolation approach is consonant with 
important parts of the FDA’s current statutory authority, which calls 
on the agency to proactively respond to new sources of information 
and allows the FDA flexibility to require postmarket studies. 
Importantly, at least with regard to prescription drugs, our proposal 
could be entirely or largely adopted without the need for statutory 
amendment. Further, it should minimally strain the FDA’s limited 
resources because it relies on informational regulation and market-
based mechanisms to influence off-label prescribing practices. 
In light of recent jurisprudence, the need for the agency to adapt 
in order to play a greater role in the informational marketplace that 
underlies physicians’ prescribing decisions has never been more 
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critical. In 2012, in United States v. Caronia,5 the Second Circuit stated 
that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not prohibit 
truthful off-label promotion, and that such prohibitions would violate 
the First Amendment.6 The Supreme Court expanded the protection 
afforded to advertising and marketing in the pharmaceutical field in 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center7 and Sorrell v. IMS 
Health.8 These cases provide momentum for the industry’s battle to 
secure increased First Amendment protection.9 Our tiered labeling 
system, in contrast to agency prohibitions on manufacturer speech, is 
in line with the Brandeis notion that the remedy for bad speech is 
more speech.10 
The FDA is also under pressure from strong consumerist 
objections to direct agency compulsion in connection with off-label 
use in clinical areas that tend to resist standardization, such as 
oncology. Our evolutionary evidence-based approach is also 
consonant with the general practice of allowing physicians to 
prescribe off-label uses in accordance with their professional 
judgment and knowledge. An optimal system would give physicians 
the flexibility to extrapolate on an individual level within reason, but 
would also ensure the collection of off-label experience data to be 
used for assessing whether the new-diagnostic, new-patient, new-
dosage, or new-treatment extrapolation is warranted. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I 
provides background on current extrapolation practices surrounding 
three concerns: reporting, testing, and enforcement. Part II proposes 
reforms, and Part III uses the case studies of the drug Seroquel and 
the medical device Lap-Band to illustrate how this system might 
 
 5. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 6. Id. at 166–67. 
 7. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). In Thompson, the Court held 
that it was unconstitutional for the FDA to prohibit pharmacies from advertising that they 
compounded specific drugs. Id. at 376–77. 
 8. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). In Sorrell, the Court held unconstitutional 
a Vermont statute that prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifying 
information for marketing purposes. Id. at 2672. 
 9. Earlier, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 3d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), 
the court held that an FDA guidance restricting certain forms of manufacturer promotion of off-
label uses imposed unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 74–75, vacated as moot sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 
331, 336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
 10. “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
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work. Although this Article focuses primarily on prescription drugs, 
the central elements of our framework apply to the regulation of 
medical devices, to over-the-counter drugs, and even to food safety. 
Indeed, as outlined in the Conclusion, our solution of evolutionary 
extrapolation can be seen as a type of Bayesian decisionmaking that 
is appropriate for a broad class of regulatory extrapolations that arise 
in a wide variety of legislative and rulemaking contexts.11 
I.  WHY THE CURRENT REGIME IS INSUFFICIENTLY DYNAMIC 
A. Overview of the Approval Process 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a federal 
regulatory agency within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) that approves and regulates drugs within the United 
States.12 The FDA’s primary mission is to protect the American 
public’s health, which the agency accomplishes when it ensures that 
drugs and medical devices are safe and effective.13 Within the FDA, 
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the largest of 
the FDA’s five centers, evaluates prescription and over-the-counter 
drugs’ safety and efficacy through premarket approval and 
postmarket regulation.14 
Premarket approval is a rigorous process that a drug must go 
through before the FDA will consider the drug to be safe and 
effective for human use. This premarket process has several stages. 
First, a product sponsor (a pharmaceutical company), having 
 
 11. See generally SIMON JACKMAN, BAYESIAN ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
(2009).  
 12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012). 
 13. Id. § 393(b)(1)–(4); see SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R41983, HOW FDA 
APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 1–2 (2012), available 
at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41983.pdf (“[The] FDA also regulates products other than 
drugs—for example, biological products, medical devices, dietary supplements, foods, cosmetics, 
animal drugs, and tobacco products.”).  
 14. How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved (last updated 
Oct. 23, 2014) (stating that “the other four FDA centers have responsibility for medical and 
radiological devices, food, and cosmetics, biologics, and veterinary drugs”); see THAUL, supra 
note 13, at 1–2 (“First, FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of new drugs . . . this process is 
called premarket approval . . . . Second, once a drug has passed that threshold and is FDA-
approved, FDA acts through its postmarket or post-approval regulatory procedures.”). For a 
simplified visual explanation of this process, see Drug Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm284393.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2014  8:34 PM 
384 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:377 
screened a drug for pharmacological activity and acute toxicity in 
animals, must submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application 
to the FDA.15 The FDA will review the IND and, if the agency is 
persuaded that clinical studies will not unreasonably place human 
subjects at risk, will authorize clinical trials.16 
After completing clinical trials, the product sponsor can submit a 
formal application, known as a New Drug Application (NDA), to the 
FDA for marketing approval. Of the twenty therapeutic drugs 
approved in 2008, the median time for agency approval of an NDA 
was 10.9 months.17 The median time from FDA authorization to initial 
testing in humans to market approval was 6.5 years.18 If a drug passes 
the FDA’s review process, the FDA will approve the drug for a 
particular indication in a specific population. 
An NDA also contains proposed labeling that must be approved 
prior to marketing. This labeling is a summary of the evidence 
supporting the safe and effective use of the drug. The primary 
purpose of drug labeling is to give healthcare providers the necessary 
information for appropriate prescription, but patients may also find 
 
 15. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/
approvalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 
2014). 
 16. Phase I trials are safety-focused: they typically involve “between 20 and 80” “healthy 
volunteers” and seek “to determine dosing, document how a drug is metabolized and excreted, 
and identify acute side effects.” Information for Consumers (Drugs): The FDA’s Drug Review 
Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last updated May 28, 2014). In 
Phase II, the drug is tested on a larger group of between one hundred and three hundred 
individuals who “have the disease or condition that the product potentially could treat.” Id. 
Researchers continue to assess the drug’s safety, but also begin evaluating its efficacy in treating 
the targeted disease or condition. Id. After Phase II, a drug is subjected to a balancing test of 
sorts: if the gravity of known risks to patients is outweighed by the efficacy of the drug and the 
severity of the disease it treats, the drug proceeds to Phase III. Information for Consumers 
(Drugs): Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, What is a Clinical Trial?, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/
ucm143531.htm (last updated Apr. 12, 2013). The third and usually final trial involves between 
one thousand and three thousand subjects with the targeted disease or condition, designed to 
gather data on safety, independent efficacy, side effects, and relative efficacy, as compared with 
other available treatments. Id. 
 17. Thomas J. Moore & Curt D. Furberg, Development Times, Clinical Testing, Postmarket 
Follow-up, and Safety Risks for the New Drugs Approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration: The Class of 2008, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 90, 92 (2014).  
 18. Id.  
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drug labeling to be a source of useful information.19 In recent years, 
the FDA has revised its labeling requirements to include more 
information and to be more accessible to physicians.20 Drug labeling is 
an important risk-communication tool for the agency, as it alerts 
providers to, among other things, warnings and precautions, 
contraindications, adverse reactions, drug interactions, recommended 
use for specific populations, dosage, and administration.21 In addition 
to standard warnings and precautions, labels may also include boxed 
or “black-box” warnings that alert prescribers to special risks.22 “The 
warnings are separated (and thus highlighted) from other text in the 
package labeling by a prominent black-box border.”23 Black-box 
warnings—the “highest level of all drug warnings promulgated by the 
FDA”24—may be required in a number of situations in which the 
FDA is aware of potentially high risks associated with the drug.25 
 
 19. Mary E. Kremzner & Steven F. Osborne, An Introduction to the Improved FDA 
Prescription Drug Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Training/ForHealthProfessionals/UCM090796.pdf. For certain prescription 
drugs, the agency does require patient labeling, called Medication Guides or Patient Package 
inserts. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Code of Federal Regulations provides: 
Certain contraindications or serious warnings, particularly those that may lead to 
death or serious injury, may be required by the FDA to be presented in a box. The 
boxed warning ordinarily must be based on clinical data . . . . The box must contain, in 
uppercase letters, a heading inside the box that includes the word “WARNING” and 
conveys the general focus of the information in the box. The box must briefly explain 
the risk and refer to more detailed information in the “Contraindications” or 
“Warnings and Precautions” section, accompanied by the identifying number for the 
section or subsection containing the detailed information. 
21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2014); see id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2014) (permitting the FDA to require 
black-box warnings relating to unapproved uses if “such usage is associated with a clinically 
significant risk or hazard”). 
 23. Karen E. Lasser, Diane L. Seger, Tony Yu, Andrew S. Karson, Julie M. Fiskio, Andrew 
C. Seger, Nidhi R. Shah, Tejal K. Gandhi, Jeffrey M. Rothschild & David W. Bates, Adherence 
to Black Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 338, 338 (2006). 
 24. Kylene Halloran & Paul G. Barash, Inside the Black Box: Current Policies and 
Concerns with the United States Food and Drug Administration’s Highest Drug Safety Warning 
System, 23 CURRENT OPINION ANESTHESIOLOGY 423, 423 (2010). 
 25. The FDA has stopped short of clearly articulating the criteria it uses in evaluating 
whether black-box warnings should be required, but it has identified three general situations in 
which such warnings would be appropriate: 
1. There is an adverse reaction so serious in proportion to the potential benefit (for 
example, a fatal, life-threatening, or permanently disabling adverse reaction) that it 
must be considered in assessing the risks and benefits of using the drug. 
2. There is a serious reaction that can be prevented or reduced in frequency or 
severity by patient selection, careful monitoring, avoiding certain concomitant 
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If the FDA determines safety measures are needed beyond the 
labeling, the agency can require the sponsor to develop a Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies plan (REMS).26 A REMS is 
required preapproval if the agency determines safety measures are 
needed beyond the professional labeling, and a REMS may also be 
required after a drug is approved if the agency becomes aware of new 
safety information.27 No two REMS are identical: each REMS has 
unique safety measures designed to mitigate risks associated with a 
particular drug or class of drugs. A REMS may include a medication 
guide or patient package-insert requirement, a communication plan, 
 
therapy, addition of another drug, or managing the patient in a specific manner or 
avoiding use in a specific clinical situation. 
3. The FDA approved the drug with restrictions on use and distribution to assure 
safe use. 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR 
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND 
PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED WARNING SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR 
HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – CONTENT AND FORMAT (Oct. 
2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm075096.pdf. 
 26. “The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) gave FDA 
the authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from manufacturers 
to ensure that the benefits of a drug or biological product outweigh its risks.” Postmarket Drug 
Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarket
drugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm111350.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2014). 
Prior to the FDAAA, the FDA used Risk Minimization Plans (RiskMaps) to influence 
physician and patient practices. RiskMaps are now integrated into the REMS regulatory 
infrastructure. Postmarket Drug Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Isotretinoin 
(Marketed as Accutane) Capsule Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm0943
05.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2010). Isotretinoin (Accutain) is a prominent example of a 
medicine with a robust RiskMap (iPledge) for pregnancy prevention in female patients. It has 
extensive requirements, such as monthly pregnancy tests, intended to prevent fetal exposure in 
patients taking isotretinoin. THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM, THE GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES FOR 
THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM (Apr. 2012), available at https://www.ipledgeprogram.com/Documents/
Guide%20to%20Best%20Practices%20-%20iPLEDGE%20Program.pdf. A sponsor report in 
February 2009 stated that forty physicians had been terminated from iPledge, primarily for 
misrepresenting information regarding patient gender and the date of the required pregnancy 
test. These discrepancies were largely reported by pharmacists and patients. Peggy Peck, SDEF: 
FDA iPledge Program Sanctions 30 Physicians, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/SDEF/12890. 
 27. Some pharmaceutical companies submit a REMS voluntarily. U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK 
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES, REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS 
MODIFICATIONS 6 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
UCM184128.pdf.  
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and elements to assure safe use (ETASU).28 ETASU are the most 
extensive potential components of a REMS, and they set out actions 
that providers and organizations must take prior to prescribing or 
dispensing a drug, or, in some cases, as a condition of allowing a 
patient to continue treatment.29 The ETASU may require special 
certification of practitioners, pharmacies, offices, and hospitals; may 
limit the settings in which a drug can be dispensed; or may mandate 
laboratory tests, registration, or other monitoring of individual 
patients.30 
The FDA can also make approval conditional upon 
postmarketing requirements (PMRs) or postmarketing commitments 
(PMCs), which are studies and clinical trials that sponsors conduct 
after approval to gather additional information about a product’s 
safety, efficacy, or optimal use.31 
B. The Off-Label Challenge—Balancing Access and Harm 
Prevention 
As a general matter, once a drug is approved, physicians may 
prescribe the drug without restriction.32 Prescribing according to 
 
 28. Id. at 5–6. REMS also require a timetable for sponsor submission to the agency of an 
assessment on the impact of a REMS. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
 30. Id. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, ADVANCES IN FDA’S SAFETY PROGRAM FOR MARKETED 
DRUGS: ESTABLISHING PREMARKET SAFETY REVIEW AND MARKETED DRUG SAFETY AS 
EQUAL PRIORITIES AT FDA’S CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm300946.pdf. PMRs are studies required by 
law, whereas PMCs are studies that are not legally required but that sponsors have agreed to 
conduct. Prior to the FDAAA, the FDA could require the following studies or clinical trials: 
“Postmarketing studies or clinical trials to demonstrate clinical benefit for drugs approved 
under the accelerated approval requirements in 21 CFR 314.510 and 21 CFR 601.41; Deferred 
pediatric studies (21 CFR 314.55(b) and 601.27(b)), where studies are required under the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA); Studies or clinical trials to demonstrate safety and 
efficacy in humans that must be conducted at the time of use of products approved under the 
Animal Efficacy Rule (21 CFR 314.610(b)(1) and 601.91(b)(1)).” Since the FDAAA, 
postmarketing studies can be required to “[a]ssess a known serious risk related to the use of the 
drug”, “[a]ssess signals of serious risk related to the use of the drug”, and “[i]dentify an 
unexpected serious risk when available data indicate the potential for a serious risk.” 
Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Post-marketingPhaseIV
Commitments (last updated Feb. 8, 2012). 
 32. See CDRH Transparency: Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical
ProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm203018.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2014) 
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FDA-approved parameters constitutes an on-label use, whereas the 
use of a drug outside those parameters constitutes an off-label use.33 
Off-label use is common: “for the 3 leading drugs in each of the 15 
leading drug classes, off-label use account[s] for approximately 21% 
of prescriptions.”34 Moreover, off-label uses may be the norm in some 
areas of practice, such as oncology, pain management, and palliative 
care, and in some patient populations, such as children, the elderly, 
and the severely ill.35 For example, about 80 percent of all drug 
prescriptions for children are off-label, and between 80 and 90 
percent of all drug prescriptions for rare diseases are off-label.36 
The central problem with off-label use is that that there is an 
information deficit. Whereas on-label use is based on scientifically 
valid and statistically significant evidence indicating that the potential 
benefits of a drug are likely to outweigh the potential risks, off-label 
use lacks such information. This is a serious problem because all 
approved drugs are potentially dangerous and have a risk of side 
effects, and patients should not be exposed to risk without evidence 
that a drug is likely to be effective. Unfortunately, the overwhelming 
 
(“The agency does not regulate the practice of medicine—how and which physicians can use a 
device.”); see also Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices, Testimony Before the 
S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of William B. Schultz, 
Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food & Drug Admin.), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm (“The legislative history of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act indicates that Congress did not intend FDA to interfere with the practice of 
medicine. Thus, once a drug is approved for marketing, FDA does not generally regulate how, 
and for what uses, physicians prescribe that drug. A physician may prescribe a drug for uses or 
in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not listed in the FDA-approved 
labeling.”). 
 33. C. Lee Ventola, Off-Label Drug Information: Regulation, Distribution, Evaluation, and 
Related Controversies, 34 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 428, 428 (2009); see also Randall S. 
Stafford, Off-Label Use of Drugs and Medical Devices: A Review of Policy Implications, 91 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 920, 920 (2012) (“‘Off-label use’ occurs when 
the use of a medication or device deviates from what is mentioned in its . . . FDA . . . product 
label.”). 
 34. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008); see Chris Adams & Alison Young, Prescribing Drugs 
“Off Label” Is Routine, but Can Injure, Kill Patients, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPER, Nov. 2, 2003, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2003/11/02/28121/prescribing-drugs-off-label-is.html (explaining 
that prescriptions for off-label use nearly doubled over five years).  
 35. Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-
Label Drug Use, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 656 (2013). 
 36. James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds: Prescriber and Marketer 
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 324 
(2003). 
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majority of off-label uses lack scientific support,37 and thus, off-label 
prescribing may place “patients at risk of harm without adequate 
knowledge of the therapeutic risks and benefits.”38 It has been 
estimated that about “15 percent of all drug uses lack scientific 
support for efficacy and more than 70 percent of off-label uses lack 
significant scientific support.”39 In 2008, one study estimated that 67 
percent of children treated with antipsychotic drugs were prescribed 
off-label treatments with an “uncertain” evidence base.40 This is at 
odds with patients’ expectation that a drug’s safety and efficacy have 
been fully evaluated.41 In fact, a recent poll of the U.S. public found 
that about half of respondents believed physicians were allowed to 
prescribe only for on-label indications, and about half believed 
physicians should be prohibited from off-label prescribing.42 When 
off-label uses are not based on significant scientific data, the 
principles of evidence-based medicine argue that “intuition, 
unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale are 
insufficient grounds for clinical decision making.”43 
On the other hand, off-label drug use is a vital tool for patient 
care. It allows physicians to treat patients for whom off-label drug use 
may be the only therapy available, including patients for whom on-
 
 37. See Tewodros Eguale, David L. Buckeridge, Nancy E. Winslade, Andrea Benedetti, 
James A. Hanley & Robyn Tamblyn, Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated 
with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., 781, 788 (2012); 
David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing Among 
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1026 (2006); see also Stafford, 
supra note 33, at 921 (“Off-label use without good evidence is common, particularly with respect 
to anticonvulsants (38% of all uses), allergy medications (31%), and psychiatric medications 
(29%).”). 
 38. Rodwin, supra note 35, at 654. 
 39. Id. at 656 (citing A. Brown, Understanding Pharmaceutical Research Manipulation in 
the Context of Accounting Manipulation, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 611, 619 (2013)); Y. Feldman, 
R. Gauthier & T. Schuller, Curbing Misconduct in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from 
Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to Law, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 620, 628 (2013). 
 40. G. C. Alexander, S. A. Gallagher, A. Mascola, R. M. Moloney & R. S. Stafford, 
Increasing Off-Label Use of Antipsychotic Medications in the United States, 1995–2008, 20 J. 
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 177, 182 (2011). 
 41. See Stafford, supra note 33, at 2 (“Among its disadvantages, off-label use undercuts the 
public expectation that there has been a full evaluation of product safety and efficacy.”).  
 42. Harris Interactive, U.S. Adults Ambivalent About the Risks and Benefits of Off-Label 
Prescription Drug Use (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/Press
Releases/tabid/446/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1506/ArticleId/986/Default.aspx. 
 43. Gordon Guyat et al., Introduction: The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine, Users’ 
Guides to the Medical Literature, 10 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 4 (2002). 
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label use has failed.44 Due to resource constraints, it will never be 
possible to study every possible drug for every possible off-label use, 
but drugs may nevertheless be safe and effective in many off-label 
contexts. For example, some drugs have been used widely for a long 
time with relatively few reported adverse events and with patients 
reporting benefit. Further, not all impressions of off-label use are 
based on anecdote; some off-label uses are supported by significant 
evidence, including from controlled clinical trials. When high-quality 
research on off-label use precedes FDA approval, early physician 
adoption can improve patient outcomes.45 Compendia, such as the 
American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, evaluate and 
disseminate evidence supporting off-label uses.46 In fact, Medicare 
Part D and other drug plans may base the reimbursement of off-label 
uses on their inclusion in major drug compendia.47 
Off-label drug use impacts more than individual patient care—it 
may also serve as a pathway to innovation. Off-label drug use can 
provide valuable data about the effects of the drug for different 
conditions and populations, and this data can then be used to inform 
future clinical practice.48 In essence, it has the capacity to create a 
clinical laboratory. Unfortunately, despite widespread use of off-label 
prescribing, patient outcomes are generally not evaluated in a 
consistent and transparent manner.49 Also, when drugs are prescribed 
for off-label uses, healthcare costs may increase.50 The cost of 
 
 44. Stafford, supra note 33, at 921. 
 45. Id.  
 46. American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS. 
PHARMACISTS, http://www.ashp.org/ahfs (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 47. R. Dresser & J. Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and 
Government Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009). A recent review of Medicare-
approved compendia governing reimbursement for off-label oncological uses, however, 
reported that the compendia were “lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and 
timeliness.” Id. at 479. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An 
Agenda for Reform, 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 515–16 (2012); see also Benjamin Falit, The 
Path to Cheaper and Safer Drugs: Revamping the Pharmaceutical Industry in Light of 
GlaxoSmithKline’s Settlement, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 179 (2005) (explaining that after 
initial FDA approval, “pharmaceutical companies [are] responsible for informing physicians 
about the safety of their drugs”). 
 50. Off-label use is widely thought to increase healthcare costs because it increases 
spending on drugs. See Stafford, supra note 33, at 3. Increased spending on drugs may increase 
healthcare costs regardless of whether patient outcomes improve. Id. On the other hand, it may 
be possible for off-label use to decrease healthcare costs if it is less expensive than an alternate 
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prescription drugs is a significant driver of the cost of healthcare in 
the United States.51 For example, of the twelve anti-cancer drugs 
approved by the FDA in 2012, eleven of them cost over $100,000 a 
year.52 Finally, off-label use disincentivizes companies from 
conducting additional clinical research because it allows them to sell 
their products without seeking FDA approval.53 Under the current 
regulatory regime, manufacturers opt for back-door approaches to 
developing off-label revenue streams because of the “enormous 
amount of time and money”54 required to seek FDA approval for a 
new use. 
Pharmaceutical companies have a significant impact on 
physicians’ off-label prescribing practices.55 Although companies are 
prohibited from directly promoting off-label drug use,56 the FDA 
 
treatment. Off-label use may also decrease costs by improving health outcomes, resulting in 
reduced need for future treatment.  
 51. Ryan Abbott, Treating the Health Care Crisis: Complementary and Alternative Medicine 
for PPACA, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 35, 57 (2011). 
 52. Experts in Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid 
Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the 
Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121 J. BLOOD 4439, 4439 (2013). 
 53. See Stafford, supra note 34, at 1427–28. 
 54. Ventola, supra note 33, at 431; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and 
Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 
237 (2011) (explaining that “[t]hese conditions disincentivize manufacturers from seeking 
formal FDA review of all but the most potentially lucrative of off-label uses, and the ones most 
likely to be granted approval”). 
 55. Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 
283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 373–80 (2000). As David Kessler wrote while he was the 
Commissioner of the FDA,  
Prescription drug advertisements sometimes distort information in ways that may be 
difficult to detect by even the trained observer. Unless the individual physician is an 
expert in the particular disease or therapeutic class linked to the drug advertisement, 
it is unlikely he or she will engage in a critical analysis of the evidence supporting 
every new drug claim . . . . 
David A. Kessler, Addressing the Problem of Misleading Advertising, 116 ANNALS INTERN. 
MED. 950, 950 (June 1, 1992). 
 56. Ventola, supra note 33, at 428. Within the FDA, the Office of Prescription Drug 
Promotion (OPDP) evaluates proposed and effective drug and device promotions—advising 
sponsors who submit draft materials as well as identifying violations. The Office of Prescription 
Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm090142.htm. The OPDP is 
charged with addressing the promotion of off-label drug use, but does not typically regulate 
nonpromotional activities and events, the dissemination of scientific material, or the exchange 
of information, unless it appears they are sponsor-backed. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i) 
(2014). The OPDP relies heavily on voluntary submissions by pharmaceutical companies, 
supplemented by limited monitoring and surveillance. Id. Violations of marketing regulations 
can result in steep fines and penalties. Id. 
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allows them to give physicians information about off-label drug uses 
from journal articles and reference publications.57 This primarily 
occurs during face-to-face sales and promotional activities, referred to 
as “detailing.”58 As the Supreme Court noted in IMS v. Sorrell, 
“[p]harmaceutical manufacturers promote their drugs to doctors 
through a process called ‘detailing.’ . . . Detailers bring . . . medical 
studies that explain the ‘details’ and potential advantages of various 
prescription drugs. Interested physicians listen, ask questions, and 
receive follow-up data.”59 Companies spend a substantial amount on 
detailing and similar marketing activities—more than $27 billion in 
2012.60 Of that amount, about $24 billion was spent on advertising to 
physicians and $3 billion was spent on direct marketing to consumers 
(primarily on television advertisements).61 Moreover, evidence 
suggests that pharmaceutical companies often violate prohibitions on 
off-label promotion.62 
Private and public insurers also have a significant influence on 
off-label use. Patients who cannot independently cover the cost of 
prescription medicines will not be able to engage in off-label use 
without insurance-cost sharing. Insurers also have a financial 
incentive to limit off-label use to the extent they believe it will 
increase overall costs.63 Private insurers have attempted to restrict 
prescribing practices by arguing that such prescriptions are not 
“medically necessary,” but this tactic has met with limited success.64 
 
 57. The agency suggests that companies follow Good Reprint Practices. U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL 
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW 
USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), 
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm. 
 58. CEGEDIM STRATEGIC DATA, 2012 U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Promotion Spending 
(2013), http://www.skainfo.com/health_care_market_reports/2012_promotional_spending.pdf. 
 59. IMS v. Sorrell, 132 S. Ct. 2653, 2656–57 (2011) (citations omitted). “Similar efforts to 
promote the use of generic pharmaceuticals are sometimes referred to as ‘counter-detailing.’” 
Id. at 2661. 
 60. See CEGEDIM STRATEGIC DATA, supra note 58, at 2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’ 
Experiences in Fraud Litigation against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1832, 1833 tbl. 1 (2010); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Shifting 
Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1557, 1566 (2009). 
 63. Ryan Abbott & Carl Stevens, Redefining Medical Necessity: A Consumer Driven 
Solution to the U.S. Health Care Crisis, 32 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 64. Id.; see Ventola, supra note 33, at 435 (detailing insurers’ arguments against off-label 
prescribing). Many courts have adopted a contra preferentem approach in challenges to insurers’ 
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The primary public insurer, CMS, generally does not reimburse for 
off-label uses in the Medicare/Medicaid context, except for off-label 
uses that are recognized as effective in various compendia.65 However, 
a 2009 survey of third-party payers administering Medicare/Medicaid 
drug benefits found vast discrepancies in reimbursement policies for 
off-label use.66 One-quarter of administrators reported that they 
simply did not reimburse off-label prescriptions, while 15 percent 
reported that they were unable to utilize effective policies covering 
off-label use because it was too difficult for them to detect.67 Among 
administrators reimbursing for off-label prescriptions, over half had 
restrictions requiring some combination of insurer preauthorization, 
limiting reimbursement to certain indications, requiring therapeutic 
alternatives prior to off-label use, limiting quantities of off-label 
prescriptions, and requiring enhanced beneficiary cost sharing.68 
Beyond the FDA, industry, and insurers, there are only a few 
significant influences on off-label prescribing. States regulate 
prescribing only insofar as to prevent fraud, avert overdose, and set 
practices for state benefits programs.69 Healthcare institutions, such as 
 
attempts to limit off-label or experimental use. Under this approach, off-label uses are covered 
unless expressly and clearly excluded by the insurance contract. In Lubeznik v. HealthChicago, 
644 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), a patient with advanced ovarian cancer obtained an 
injunction requiring her insurance company to pre-certify her for a debatably experimental 
treatment. Lubeznik v. HealthChicago, 644 N.E.2d 777, 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The 
primary source of data used to assess the procedure was the treating physician, who claimed to 
have performed twenty-one such procedures with a 75 percent success rate. Id. at 779. “In 1993, 
a California jury awarded $89 million in damages against an insurer that had refused to cover 
ABTM, including $77 million in punitive damages.” BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 643 (7th ed. 2013). Eventually, thirty thousand women 
received the same treatment at a cost of $3 billion. Id. at 644. Fewer than ten years after Bonnie 
Lubeznik’s landmark case against the insurer was decided in her favor, studies proved the 
treatment had no beneficial effects. Id. 
 65. See Compendia for Determination of Medically-Accepted Indications for Off-Label 
Uses of Drugs and Biologicals in an Anti-Cancer Chemotherapeutic Regimen, 42 C.F.R. 
§ 414.930 (2014). Compendia summarize and evaluate the evidence supporting off-label uses. 
Dresser & Frader, supra note 47, at 479. However, these evaluations are not as rigorous as FDA 
review. Id. Compendia have been criticized as lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and 
timeliness. Katherine Tillman, Brijet Burton, Louis B. Jacques & Steve E. Phurrough, 
Compendia and Anticancer Therapy Under Medicare, 150 ANNALS INTERN. MED., 348, 348–49 
(2009). 
 66. J. Cohen, A. Wilson & L. Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
391, 394 (2009). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Law: Prescription Limits, 
http://www.cdc.gov/HomeandRecreationalSafety/Poisoning/laws/rx_limits.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2014). There are exceptions—for example, states such as Ohio and Oklahoma have 
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Kaiser and the Veteran’s Administration, may have restrictions or 
internal protocols regarding off-label use, but these apply only 
internally. Medical associations may make recommendations 
regarding best practices or clinical guidelines, but otherwise do not 
censor or participate in assessing prescribing habits, especially on the 
level of individual patients. Finally, tort liability acts as a constraint 
on physicians’ prescribing practices to the extent that off-label 
prescribing can generate malpractice liability if it fails to adhere to 
accepted standards of care.70 
C. The FDA’s Postmarket Regulation 
The FDA has various tools for postmarket regulation: reporting 
requirements, agency surveillance, warnings, and postmarket trial 
requirements for pharmaceutical companies. Product sponsors are 
required to submit postmarket reports of all serious and unexpected 
adverse reactions to the FDA’s Adverse Events Reporting System 
(AERS)71 within fifteen days of becoming aware of the event.72 
Physicians and patients are not required to report adverse events, but 
may report adverse reactions voluntarily to the FDA’s MedWatch73 
reporting system, the data from which is incorporated in the AERS 
database.74 Pharmaceutical companies are also required to report the 
results of any postmarket clinical trials and findings from their own 
and others’ research and publications.75 
The FDA’s CDER and Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology 
analyze data submitted by manufacturers, physicians, and patients 
after a drug goes on the market. Agency scientists examine reported 
 
required (or have attempted to require) that mifespristone, or abortifacients generally, be used 
on-label. Irin Carmon, Court Blocks Arizona Abortion Restrictions, MSNBC (June 3, 2014, 3:55 
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/court-blocks-arizona-abortion-restrictions. 
 70. S.R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An 
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 194 (1999). 
 71. Drug Approvals and Databases: Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm135151.htm (last updated 
Sept. 17, 2014). For additional information about AERS, see Adverse Event Reporting System 
(FAERS) (formerly AERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm 
(last updated Sept. 8, 2014) (discussing problems with data in the FAERS system). 
 72. Records and Reports Concerning Adverse Drug Experiences on Marketed Prescription 
Drugs for Human Use Without Approved New Drug Applications, 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 (2014). 
 73. MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch (last updated Oct. 25, 2014). 
 74. THAUL, supra note 13, at 11. 
 75. Id. at 12; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2012) (describing records and reporting requirements). 
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data to determine which adverse reactions are related to the drug.76 
Although the present system is largely passive, relying on third-party 
reports submitted to the agency, the FDA “has started to develop an 
infrastructure that uses data from public and private sources . . . and 
expands its information base.”77 Through the new, more active 
surveillance system, the Sentinel Initiative, the FDA aims to “better 
detect safety signals, analyze data to understand them, and identify 
strategies to fix the problem.”78 The Sentinel Initiative now has the 
capacity to monitor adverse events in over one hundred million U.S. 
residents by actively querying diverse automated healthcare-data 
holders—including electronic medical-record systems, insurance-
claims databases, and registries.79 
The FDA can mandate drug-label changes to warn physicians 
and patients when the agency becomes aware of new safety 
information that it determines should be included in the labeling.80 
Such changes range from requiring pharmaceutical companies to 
update warnings and precautions, to imposing a black-box warning. 
Although boxed warnings may be required at the time of FDA 
approval, they are more commonly added after a drug has been 
approved and the FDA has received reports of adverse effects.81 
 
 76. THAUL, supra note 13, at 12. 
 77. Id. at 13. 
 78. Id.; see Sentinel Initiative—Transforming How We Monitor Product Safety: FDA’s 
Sentinel Initiative—Ongoing Projects, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ucm203500.htm (last updated July 11, 2012) (describing the 
“scientific operations needed for the Sentinel Initiative”); FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/default.htm (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2014) (providing an overview of the Sentinel Initiative); Sentinel Initiative—
Transforming How We Monitor Product Safety: Sentinel Initiative: A National Strategy for 
Monitoring Medical Product Safety, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda
.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ucm089474.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010) (detailing the 
Sentinel Initiative); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, SENTINEL INITIATIVE, http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM124701.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (same). 
 79. See sources cited supra note 78. 
 80. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (2012); see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE 
FD&C ACT (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM250783.pdf (discussing the FDA’s thoughts on how the 
regulation and the statutory provision relate to one another in the safety-labeling-changes 
guidance). 
 81. NORMAN S. MARKS & KAREN WEISS, BOXED WARNINGS AND OTHER FDA 
COMMUNICATION TOOLS 259 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/
MedWatch/UCM201430.pdf.  
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In 2007, Congress substantially expanded the FDA’s ability to 
require postmarket studies under the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act (FDAAA).82 The agency can now demand PMRs 
to assess a known serious risk, to assess signals of a serious risk, or to 
identify an unexpected serious risk.83 After drug approval, the agency 
needs new safety information to demand a PMR.84 Congress’s passage 
of the FDAAA was a direct and powerful response to reported 
“inadequacies in drug companies’ fulfillment of . . . postmarketing 
studies and weaknesses in FDA’s regulatory authority to enforce 
these commitments.”85 As the breadth of the statutory language 
suggests, the FDAAA “envisions heavy use, during the postmarket 
period, of large observational studies that rely on interoperable 
health data networks.”86 Indeed, this authorization represented the 
most transformative amendment to the FDCA in the last fifty years.87 
It has been characterized as “a sweeping overhaul of  . . . both the 
FDCA and the Public Health Service Act”88 and “a profound change 
in law.”89 Before the FDAAA, the FDA could only request that 
pharmaceutical companies conduct postmarket testing.90 
As a final step, the FDA has the authority to revoke marketing 
authorization and remove a drug from the market. Four percent of 
approved drugs are eventually removed.91 
 
 82. Jill Wechsler, FDAAA Empowers FDA To Have Greater Control over Drug Safety, 
FORMULARY WATCH (Dec. 1, 2007), http://formularyjournal.modernmedicine.com/formulary-
journal/news/clinical/clinical-pharmacology/fdaaa-empowers-fda-have-greater-control-over-d. 
 83. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823, § 901(a) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Kevin Fain, Matthew Daubresse & G. Caleb Alexander, The Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 202, 
202 (2013) (citing a 2006 report by the Office of Inspector General). 
 86. Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 420–21 (2010). 
 87. See id. at 422–23 (discussing the history of amendments to the FDCA and 
characterizing the FDAAA as “the most momentous shift in drug regulation in half a century”). 
 88. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts To 
Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L. J. 461, 467 (2008). 
 89. Evans, supra note 86, at 422. 
 90. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADVANCES IN FDA’S SAFETY PROGRAM FOR 
MARKETED DRUGS: ESTABLISHING PREMARKET SAFETY REVIEW AND MARKETED DRUG 
SAFETY AS EQUAL PRIORITIES AT FDA’S CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH 
(2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm300946.pdf. 
 91. Abbott, supra note 4, at 228 n.9. 
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D. Problems with FDA Postmarket Regulation 
Evidence suggests that the FDA is not yet optimally regulating 
off-label and postmarket drug use despite its expanded statutory 
mandate.92 Notwithstanding expectations that the FDA would use its 
enhanced regulatory power under the FDAAA to more aggressively 
police postmarket drug use, the agency has demonstrated reluctance 
to realize the ambitious statutory mandate envisioned by Congress. 
The FDA has required relatively few postmarket studies and has 
allowed manufacturers to drag their feet in responding to the requests 
that the FDA has submitted.93 For example, a 2014 study found that 
the FDA had required eighty-five PMCs for the twenty therapeutic 
drugs approved in 2008, but that only twenty-six had been fulfilled, 
and only eight had been submitted for agency review.94 In addition, a 
2013 report by the Office of the Inspector General concluded that the 
agency had failed to consistently enforce REMS requiring ETASU. 
The FDA approved 199 REMS between 2008 and 2011.95 However, 
FDA review memoranda of forty-nine recent sponsor assessments of 
 
 92. “Congress has enacted legislation to expand the FDA’s authority with the intent of 
protecting the public health but often without appropriating the necessary resources.” Raymond 
L. Woosley, One Hundred Years of Drug Regulation: Where Do We Go from Here?, 53 
ANNUAL REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 255, 265 (2013). That was in the best of times. 
The federal shutdown in October 2013 “left US public health systems reeling and exposed their 
vulnerability to national politics.” Bridget M. Kuehn, Shutdown Underscored Vulnerability of 
US Public Health and Biomedical Research to Political Wrangling, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1907 
(2013). About half of the FDA’s staff were furloughed. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., CONTINGENCY STAFFING PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF ENACTED 
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS (2013), http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2014/fy2014contingency_
staffing_plan-rev6.pdf. 
 93. See Howard Bauchner & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Editorial, Restoring Confidence in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 607, 608 (2013) (explaining that “an important 
proportion of these [postmarket] studies are not completed in a timely fashion” and lamenting 
that “[w]ithout rigorous postmarketing studies, the true risk and safety profile of a drug in the 
‘real-world’ patient population is not defined”); Fain et al., supra note 85, at 202–03 (analyzing 
the FDA’s use of postmarket studies from 2007 and 2011 and concluding that this “analysis 
reinforces continued concerns about the status of prescription drug postmarketing studies in the 
United States”). 
 94. Thomas J. Moore & Curt D. Furberg, Development Times, Clinical Testing, Postmarket 
Follow-up, and Safety Risks for the New Drugs Approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration: The Class of 2008, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 90, 90 (2014). 
(“None of the trials conducted prior to approval assessed the efficacy of the drug beyond 24 
weeks, including for those medications intended for open ended use.”). 
 95. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA LACKS 
COMPREHENSIVE DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY, No. OEI-04-11-00510, at 11 (2013).  
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REMS showed that only seven met all requirements.96 Of the sponsor 
assessments, “nearly half . . . did not include all information requested 
in FDA assessment plans,” and ten were late.97 
Although current labeling practices, including boxed warnings, 
have been shown in some studies to decrease prescriptions and sales 
of certain drugs,98 these warnings have been widely criticized as 
ineffective99 and arbitrary.100 Indeed, one study found that more than 
40 percent of ambulatory-care patients received at least one 
potentially relevant black-box warning medication in a thirty-month 
period, and that compliance with black-box warnings was “highly 
variable.”101 Another observational study of fifty-one outpatient 
practices using an electronic health record looked at a total of 324,548 
patients and found that 33,778 of them (10.4 percent) received a 
medication with a black-box warning. In 7 percent of those cases, the 
prescribing physician violated the black-box warning.102 Despite the 
specificity of their labeling requirements, black-box warnings have 
arguably failed to prevent the potentially dangerous drug uses they 
were designed to target. Instead, they have engendered confusion and 
controversy among prescribers. This warning system is at once too 
inflexible in demanding a binary distinction between one small set of 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., E. Ray Dorsey, Sarah A. Gallagher, Rena M. Conti & G. Caleb Alexander, 
Impact of FDA Black Box Advisory on Antipsychotic Medication Use, 170 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 96, 100 (2010) (finding that the FDA’s April 2005 advisory and black-box 
warning requirements concerning the increased risk of mortality associated with the use of 
certain antipsychotics among elderly patients “was associated with a decrease in the use of the 
medications,” and that this decline lasted more than two years). 
 99. See, e.g., Anita K. Wagner, K. Arnold Chan, Inna Dashevsky, Marsha A. Raebel, Susan 
E. Andrade, Jennifer Elston Lafata, Robert L. Davis, Jerry H. Gurwitze, Stephen B. Soumerai 
& Richard Platt, FDA Drug Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty or Half Full?, 
15 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOL. & DRUG SAFETY 369, 370–74 (2006) (characterizing black-box 
warnings’ “effectiveness as a risk communication tool” as “debatable” and identifying the “need 
for better methods of ensuring the safe use of medications that are considered to carry serious 
risks”). 
 100. See, e.g., Halloran & Barash, supra note 24, at 424 (“The nonspecific and arguably 
unscientific methods by which a drug receives a [black-box warning], in addition to biases of 
committee members making critical decisions regarding the fate of dangerous drugs, have cast 
doubt on the quality of the system.”); see generally Bryan A. Liang, Editorial, FDA Use of the 
Black Box Warning: Time for Reevaluation as a Safety Tool, 14 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 561 
(2003) (lamenting the FDA’s failure to provide specific guidance regarding the conditions under 
which black-box warnings may be required). 
 101. Wagner et al., supra note 99, at 374. 
 102. Lasser et al., supra note 23, at 340. 
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drug uses and all others and too feeble in failing to impose significant 
costs on those who ignore it. 
II.  DESIGNING AN EVOLUTIONARY, EVIDENCE-BASED 
EXTRAPOLATION REGULATION 
A. Improved Data Collection 
The starting point for our proposal to is to improve reporting of 
off-label drug use in the United States. Although we are by no means 
the first to identify the problems with our current reporting regime in 
this area,103 we believe that the benefits of integrating and 
consolidating existing information regarding off-label use are greater 
today than ever before and, indeed, may be achieved through a 
combination of several modest tweaks to existing policies.104 
Specifically, we believe that five concrete and politically achievable 
policy changes would dramatically improve the quality and quantity 
of information available regarding off-label use: (1) requiring greater 
manufacturer reporting of off-label use, (2) including diagnostic codes 
in adverse event reporting, (3) including diagnostic codes in 
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement requests, (4) requiring diagnostic 
use at the point of prescription for a subset of FDA-designated drugs, 
and (5) disseminating publicly the de-identified collected data. 
1. Manufacturer Reporting of Off-Label Use.  First, we 
recommend that manufacturers be required to provide the FDA with 
 
 103. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 34, at 1427–29 (identifying the absence of consistent, 
detailed reporting on off-label drug use); Surrey M. Walton, Glen T. Shumock, Ky-Van Lee, G. 
Caleb Alexander, David Meltzer & Randall S. Stafford, Prioritizing Future Research on Off-
Label Prescribing: Results of a Quantitative Evaluation, 28 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1443, 1450 
(2008) (“Policy surrounding data collection, coding, and the prescription mechanism need to be 
updated, particularly in the current environment where many health systems are moving to 
electronic health records and electronic prescribing.”). 
 104. When Congress amended the FDA’s statutory mandate in 2007, the FDA expressed a 
keen awareness of the potential benefits from improving communication and enhancing its data-
collection systems. The FDA explained, for example, that “[i]mproving our communication and 
information flows will further strengthen the effectiveness of the drug safety system.” U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY – PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE 
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC: FDA’S RESPONSE TO THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S 2006 REPORT 12 
(2007). Our proposal takes the FDA at its word and suggests that this objective may be achieved 
through a combination of relatively minor changes in the reporting requirements of various 
actors in the off-label-drug market. 
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annual reports on the off-label uses of their drugs.105 These reports 
would provide a rough breakdown of each approved drug’s annual 
sales by diagnostic code, thus allowing the FDA to identify the 
diagnoses for which each of its approved drugs was being used in the 
United States. This type of reporting requirement may seem onerous 
at first blush but, in fact, would do little more than require 
manufacturers to disclose the information they already have—indeed, 
the same information that allows them to turn handsome profits from 
off-label use.106 Manufacturers acquire this information from a variety 
of sources; for example, they purchase data on off-label use from 
companies that aggregate data on physicians’ prescribing practices.107 
This data represents a vital component of the detailing process, as it is 
used to refine marketing tactics and to increase sales.108 
Manufacturers are also, as many commentators have pointed 
out, intimately involved in the development of peer-reviewed 
research documenting the off-label uses of their drugs.109 To cite only 
 
 105. This information is not currently required of manufacturers, which are required to 
submit reports only on adverse events. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2014). 
 106. As the FDA has explained,  
[s]cientific or medical departments within drug or medical device firms often maintain 
a large body of information about their products. This information typically includes 
data and other information consistent with the approved or cleared indications or 
conditions of use for their products, but may also include off-label information for 
their products. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (Dec. 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf. 
 107. Although physicians are not required to detail the diagnostic codes of off-label 
treatments, they often choose to do so, and commentators have noted that the cost of providing 
diagnostic codes has decreased substantially in recent years. See, e.g., Walton et al., supra note 
103, at 1450 (explaining that although “physicians are not required to document the indication 
for which a drug is prescribed . . . [d]ocumentation of a diagnosis for each drug prescribed is 
likely to be increasingly useful and feasible [and] at the same time could reduce medication 
errors”). 
 108. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2657 (2011).  
 109. See, e.g., Ventola, supra note 33, at 430 (discussing manufacturers’ ability to “conduct 
the clinical trials that are necessary to gain regulatory approval and then disseminate these data 
through marketing, advertising, and publication in the medical literature”). The involvement of 
manufacturers in developing the literature supporting the efficacy of certain off-label uses has 
only increased, according to several commentators, since the FDA began allowing 
manufacturers to distribute reprints of this literature in 2009. See, e.g., Kesselheim, supra note 
54, at 256 (discussing the ability of manufacturers to “pass out medical journal article reprints 
that discuss off-label uses without the off-label use being the subject of an [FDA 
investigation]”); Mello et al., supra note 62, at 1559 (discussing manufacturers’ historical ability 
to distribute peer-reviewed literature on off-label uses and noting the effects of the FDA’s 2009 
guidance on this practice). 
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a few of the most public (and controversial) examples, the 
manufacturer of one hemostatic agent approved for the treatment of 
hemophilia “played a substantial role in sponsoring, designing, 
directing, analyzing, and publishing much of the . . . evidence” 
supporting the drug’s off-label use;110 Eli Lilly sponsored and 
developed a series of articles appearing in publications such as the 
New England Journal of Medicine regarding the off-label use of its 
drug, recombinant human activated protein C (Xigris);111 and 
Allergan, the manufacturer of Botox, has recently pointed to studies 
demonstrating the efficacy of off-label uses of its drug—uses that now 
support nearly half of the drug’s sales.112 In examples such as these, 
manufacturers’ knowledge of off-label uses has supported a 
significant portion—and in some cases a majority—of their drugs’ 
sales, yet manufacturers have no obligation to share this knowledge 
with the FDA.113 Although third-party researchers have been able to 
provide a rough picture of off-label use by relying on various 
datasets,114 the manufacturers themselves remain free to withhold the 
information that frequently winds up printed in ghost-written, peer-
reviewed articles and that ultimately supports a significant source of 
their revenue.115 Requiring manufacturers to provide the FDA with 
 
 110. Veronica Yank et al., Systematic Review: Benefits and Harms of In-Hospital Use of 
Recombinant Factor VIIa for Off-Label Indications, 154 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 529, 537 (2011). 
 111. See ROSS MCKINNEY, AMY P. ABERNETHY, DAVID B. MATCHAR & JANE L. 
WHEELER, POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUG COMPENDIA 10 
(2009). 
 112. See Jef Feeley & Phil Milford, Allergan Holders Can Proceed with Botox Suit, Judge 
Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-
11/allergan-holders-can-proceed-with-botox-suit-judge-rules-1-.html. 
 113. See, e.g., Kesselheim, supra note 54, at 235–36 (explaining that nearly 75 percent of one 
oncology drug’s use was off-label); Tracy Staton, Allergan Inks $600M Off-Label Settlement, 
FIERCEPHARMA (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/allergan-inks-600m-label-
settlement/2010-09-02 (providing examples of manufacturers prioritizing off-label drug use). 
 114. See, e.g., Radley et al., supra note 37, at 1025 (estimating the prevalence of off-label 
prescriptions by using the 2001 National Disease and Therapeutic Index, which the authors 
characterize as “a nationally representative survey of office-based physicians”); see also Walton 
et al., supra note 103, at 1445 (discussing researchers’ ability to “quantif[y] the volume of off-
label uses for a specific drug by using the National Disease and Therapeutic Index”); S.M. 
Walton, W.L. Galanter & D. Sarne, A Trial of Inpatient Indication Based Prescribing During 
Computerized Order Entry with Medications Commonly Used Off-Label, 2 APPLIED CLINICAL 
INFO. 94 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3631908 (conducting 
a clinical study to estimate the magnitude of off-label use of certain drugs). 
 115. Sergio Sismondo, Ghosts in the Machine: Publication Planning in the Medical Sciences, 
39 SOC. STUD. SCI. 171, 198 (2009); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the 
Medical Literature Is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS 
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data on off-label use on an annual basis would also mitigate many of 
the perverse incentives to engage in the type of “loopholing” 
behavior discussed above.116 
To be sure, annual reporting of off-label uses would not be 
without its own administrative costs. But these costs should not be 
overstated, particularly in light of the resources manufacturers 
already devote to off-label research and sales. The costs imposed by 
our proposed reporting requirement, therefore, are not search costs—
that is, the manufacturer need provide only information that is 
already within its knowledge or that would be easily ascertainable. 
Instead, the costs are simply those of providing this information to a 
different audience: regulators, rather than potential customers. 
In the spirit of the regulations we propose and in recognition of 
the potentially imperfect information available to manufacturers, the 
FDA could grant the manufacturers the kind of reporting flexibility 
that is apparent in other areas of FDA regulation.117 The FDA could 
require manufacturers to use reasonable diligence to become 
informed and to report what they know. Finally, because 
manufacturers already do report to the FDA at regular intervals, 
including on an annual basis,118 compliance with our proposal is highly 
unlikely to impose unreasonable or excessive costs on these 
businesses. Our proposal would thus avoid the perverse incentives 
toward antitransparency that currently prevail in manufacturers’ off-
label practices and would impose few incremental costs on 
manufacturers. 
 
MEDICINE 1429, 1433 (2007); see Sergio Sismondo, Key Opinion Leaders, the Corruption of 
Medical Knowledge, and the Sunshine Act, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 1, 27 (2013). 
 116. See Kesselheim, supra note 54, at 228 (discussing manufacturers’ use of improper off-
label promotions). Annual reports could also require disclosure of a pharmaceutical company’s 
sponsorship of research and publications. 
 117. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR 
NONPRESCRIPTION HUMAN DRUG PRODUCTS MARKETED WITHOUT AN APPROVED 
APPLICATION 5, 7 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/
ucm171672.pdf (discussing manufacturers’ obligation to disclose adverse events within fifteen 
days and emphasizing that, given the urgency of adverse events and the limited timeframe to file 
a report, a manufacturer’s efforts to provide adequate information need only be “reasonable”). 
A similar “reasonableness” standard would be appropriate here, and, as discussed above, such a 
standard would have clear precedents in FDA regulations. 
 118. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CMC POSTAPPROVAL MANUFACTURING CHANGES REPORTABLE 
IN ANNUAL REPORTS 1–5 (2014) (discussing manufacturers’ annual-reporting requirements 
under other FDA regulations). 
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2. Enhanced Reporting of Adverse Events.  The second element 
of our proposal to improve reporting calls for the reporting of 
diagnostic codes in AERS. Here, we suggest two straightforward 
changes to FDA policy in this area: allowing physicians to include 
diagnostic codes in their reporting of adverse events and imposing a 
duty of inquiry on manufacturers to ascertain the diagnostic codes of 
prescriptions in their reports. Data on patient diagnostic codes is 
particularly valuable because it can be used in data-mining strategies 
on large data sets to detect and analyze associations between off-label 
uses, diagnostic codes, and adverse events.119 In 2011, the FDA 
received a total of 874,116 reports of adverse events.120 
Under the current AERS regime, physicians do not report 
diagnostic codes of adverse events—even if they would be inclined to 
do so.121 The reality, however, is that patients who experience adverse 
drug events usually have diagnostic codes associated with their 
indication for taking the drug (as well as for their comorbidities and 
the adverse event itself).122 Similarly, in the vaccination context, 
researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of including 
diagnostic codes in post-vaccination adverse events, even though such 
reporting entails the additional burden of following up with patients 
for a period following vaccination.123 Physicians’ use of diagnostic 
codes in reporting adverse events is neither universal nor perfect, but 
it ought to be an option available to doctors who do report adverse 
events to the FDA—particularly since many of them already 
 
 119. Abbott, supra note 4, at 239. 
 120. FDA Adverse Events Reporting System (FAERS): Reports Received and Reports 
Entered into FAERS by Year, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070434.htm 
(last updated Aug. 6, 2013). 
 121. See Paul Hougland, Jonathan Nebeker, Steve Pickard, Mark Van Tuinen, Carol 
Masheter, Susan Elder, Scott Williams & Wu Xu, Using ICD-9-CM Codes in Hospital Claims 
Data to Detect Adverse Events in Patient Safety Surveillance, ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: 
NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 12–15 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK43647/pdf/advances-hougland_26.pdf. 
 122. See id. at 2 (“Virtually all inpatient discharges are assigned International Classification 
of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes.”). As Paul Hougland and 
his colleagues have proposed, “[i]n the case of an adverse drug event (ADE), a diagnosis code 
would be used to indicate the patient’s general diagnosis . . . while the E-code would indicate the 
drug class thought responsible for these symptoms.” Id. 
 123. See ROSS LAZARUS, HARVARD PILGRIM HEALTH CARE, INC., ELECTRONIC SUPPORT 
SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC HEALTH – VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (2010), 
http://healthit.ahrq.gov/ahrq-funded-projects/electronic-support-public-health-vaccine-adverse-
event-reporting-system/activity/2010 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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document these diagnostic codes for other purposes. Thus, under our 
proposal, physicians would have the ability to provide diagnostic 
codes in reporting adverse events, although they would not be 
required to do so. Requiring physicians to report diagnostic codes 
might burden physicians and discourage them from voluntarily 
submitting adverse events. 
Manufacturers, in contrast, would have a duty of reasonable 
inquiry to determine the diagnostic code for the original prescription 
that gave rise to the adverse event. This requirement would impose 
minimal incremental burdens on manufacturers for at least three 
reasons. First, as discussed above, physicians often document the 
diagnostic codes of adverse events and also often notify 
manufacturers of the event; under our proposal, manufacturers could 
simply request that physicians relay the information that may well be 
in their possession already. Second, the FDA already requires 
manufacturers to provide a basic diagnosis, or something close to it, 
in reporting the adverse event. Under FDA regulations, “a serious 
adverse event should, at a minimum, be described in terms of signs 
(including abnormal laboratory findings), symptoms, or disease 
diagnosis for purposes of reporting.”124 Indeed, the FDA 
“encourage[s], as appropriate, attachment of the following: (1) 
hospital discharge summaries, (2) autopsy reports, (3) relevant 
laboratory data, and (4) other critical clinical data” in manufacturers’ 
adverse event reports.125 Finally, a duty of reasonable inquiry to 
determine the diagnostic code is consistent with manufacturers’ 
general obligations to investigate the facts of adverse events, which 
require manufacturers to follow up with medical personnel and 
victims to ascertain details that may not have been available at the 
time the incident was first reported.126 Manufacturers would not be 
punished if physicians or hospitals refused to provide the diagnostic 
information, but they would have to maintain a system to ask the 
question (and to record and report the answer). Thus, by voluntarily 
collecting diagnostic codes from doctors and imposing a duty of 
inquiry on manufacturers, the FDA would gain a powerful tool in 
 
 124. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 117, at 6. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining that “[i]f a report received by the responsible person refers 
to groups of unknown size, such as ‘some’ or ‘a few’ college students [who] got anaphylaxis, the 
responsible person should follow up to find out the number and then submit a separate report to 
FDA for each identifiable patient”). 
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gathering information regarding off-label drug use while imposing 
very few additional costs on physicians and manufacturers. 
3. Medicare/Medicaid Reimbursement Requests.  With the third 
element of our enhanced reporting proposal, we join other scholars in 
calling for the inclusion of diagnostic codes in all Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursement requests. Currently, CMS requires diagnostic codes 
only under Medicare Part B.127 As Jennifer Herbst has explained, the 
current Medicare/Medicaid system lacks a “single database within the 
federal healthcare system in which a patient’s outpatient prescription 
drug use can be cross-referenced with his medical diagnoses.”128 This 
results in a suboptimal use of finite healthcare resources, as CMS pays 
for prescriptions not approved under the statutory language of 
Medicare Part D and Medicaid,129 as well as in a lost opportunity to 
seize informational advantages and to fulfill the Obama 
administration’s goal of improving the storage of electronic medical 
records.130 One solution, which Professor Herbst has persuasively put 
forth and which we support, is to “[m]ake patient diagnosis codes a 
necessary condition for payment of outpatient prescription drugs by 
 
 127. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, 
ch. 15, § 50.4.1, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/downloads/bp102c15.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014) (“Use of the drug or biological must be safe and effective and otherwise reasonable and 
necessary. . . . Drugs or biologicals approved for marketing by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) are considered safe and effective for purposes of this requirement when 
used for indications specified on the labeling.”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, ch. 3, § 20, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
downloads/clm104c07.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, ch. 17, § 80.1.3, http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/clm104c17.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014) (“A cancer diagnosis code must be reported when billing for [oral cancer drugs using] 
these HCPCS [Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System] codes. If there is no cancer 
diagnosis the claim is denied.”). 
 128. Jennifer L. Herbst, How Medicare Part D, Medicaid, Electronic Prescribing and ICD-10 
Could Improve Public Health (But Only If CMS Lets Them), 24 HEALTH MATRIX 209, 217 
(2014). 
 129. Professor Herbst, for example, supports this finding by quoting a recent HHS report’s 
finding that “50 percent of Medicare Part D claims [reviewed] were erroneous because the 
claimed drugs were not provided for medically accepted indications.” Id. at 218 (quoting U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENSURING THAT MEDICARE 
PART D REIMBURSEMENT IS LIMITED TO DRUGS PROVIDED FOR MEDICALLY ACCEPTED 
INDICATIONS 6 (2011)). 
 130. Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act, passed as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
healthcare professionals receive subsidies for transitioning to electronic medical records. See 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300jj-11–300jj-51, §§ 17901–17940 (2012)). 
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Medicare Part D and Medicaid.”131 For our purposes, the key benefit 
of this requirement would be an informational one: with this single 
step, we would gain the ability to link off-label Medicare/Medicaid 
prescriptions to those in other areas and thus be able to provide a 
more complete picture of the evolving (and untested) use of certain 
drugs. This would result in a very robust dataset, as CMS covers 
about one hundred million U.S. residents.132 Not only would this have 
the additional benefit of potentially saving CMS billions of dollars, 
but it would also have a substantial impact on the private-insurance 
market because many private payers follow CMS coverage and 
reimbursement policies.133 
We diverge from other scholars, including Professor Herbst, in 
proposing that Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements should mandate 
diagnostic codes. Professor Herbst, for example, has stopped short of 
giving her proposal the teeth we recommend because, if healthcare 
professionals could be denied reimbursement for failing to provide 
diagnostic codes, they “may decide to tailor their diagnostic coding 
practices for payment (and thus, effective treatment) purposes rather 
than reflecting their patients’ actual diagnoses.”134 Because this 
outcome, in Professor Herbst’s view, would likely result in fraudulent 
prescriptions and risk patient safety, we should continue reimbursing 
prescribers and physicians who fail to include diagnostic codes in their 
reimbursement requests.135 
We disagree. First, we believe that the risks Professor Herbst 
identifies are overstated. Because Medicare/Medicaid patients make 
up such a substantial portion of certain healthcare markets, including 
the majority of many prescribers’ customer bases and the majority of 
users of certain drugs, we believe that the professionals in these 
markets are far more likely to comply with providing diagnostic 
 
 131. Herbst, supra note 128, at 211. 
 132. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014). 
 133. Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Anna D. Kraus & Katherine Sauser, From Research to 
Revenue: Coverage and Reimbursement for Life Sciences Products—Coverage and 
Reimbursement Recommendations from the MEDCAC, BLOOMBERG LAW, 
http://bna.com/from-research-to-revenue (Aug. 24, 2011); see also, e.g., ZACKS EQUITY 
RESEARCH, Reimbursement Decision for BSX’ Alair, ZACKS, (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www
.zacks.com/stock/news/71644/Reimbursement-Decision-for-BSX-Alair (noting that a positive 
reimbursement decision from CMS is expected to encourage private insurers to provide 
reimbursement). 
 134. Herbst, supra note 128, at 218. 
 135. Id. 
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codes—and, by extension, to pressure manufacturers to seek approval 
for certain off-label uses. Second, because of the size and complexity 
of the Medicare and Medicaid regimes in general, we believe that the 
only means to ensure compliance is to deny reimbursements to those 
who fail to provide diagnostic codes. This approach, though harsh, is 
the traditional way of incentivizing compliance with 
Medicare/Medicaid policies,136 and we see no reason why this 
requirement should be the exception. Finally, with respect to 
Professor Herbst’s concern about physicians responding to this 
requirement by writing fraudulent prescriptions (to provide drugs to 
their patients while also protecting their own reimbursements), we 
believe that she overlooks the capacity of the Medicare/Medicaid 
fraud-prevention apparatus to combat such activities. Indeed, just as 
President Obama’s healthcare policy places increasing emphasis on 
enhancing data collection, it imposes stricter punishments on 
physicians who engage in Medicare/Medicaid fraud through 
inappropriate billing—targeting and deterring doctors who embrace 
precisely the strategies that Professor Herbst identifies, however 
noble their motives may be.137 Denying Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursements for healthcare professionals’ failure to include 
diagnostic codes in the context of off-label drug use, therefore, is 
unlikely to present the challenges Professor Herbst identifies and is 
instead a critical step in promoting compliance with this policy. 
4. Enhanced Reporting in Prescription of Certain FDA-
Designated Drugs.  We suggest that the FDA can and should be able 
to create a subset of certain designated drugs for which all scripts 
must include diagnostic use. This suggestion reflects a simple and 
long-recognized reality of off-label drug use in the United States: it is 
heavily concentrated in the uses of certain drugs, for which there is 
often little or no evidence supporting its effectiveness. For example, 
the off-label use of antidepressant drugs such as promethazine, 
clonazepam, and Seroquel all exceed 75 percent of their total use;138 
likewise, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) 
 
 136. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(e) (2014) (authorizing a Medicare intermediary to suspend 
reimbursement payments to a provider that fails to maintain adequate medical records, as 
defined by 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(d) (2014)). 
 137. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, The 
Affordable Care Act and Fighting Fraud, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicare
fraud.gov/aboutfraud/aca-fraud/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 138. Walton et al., supra note 103, at 1447. 
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estimates that 50 to 75 percent of all anticancer therapy prescriptions 
are off-label.139 In areas such as these, particularly where there have 
been numerous adverse events or other “red flags” of potential harm, 
the FDA should have the option—though not the obligation—to 
impose stricter requirements, such as the use of a diagnostic code at 
the prescription stage. This is something that a number of insurers 
and managed care organizations already require internally, but they 
have no obligation to share their data with the FDA. 
The key benefit of this policy would be to give the FDA the tools 
it needs to more closely monitor extrapolated uses of drugs where 
they are likely to be prevalent and harmful; although this level of 
information for all prescriptions may be unnecessary, it is important 
for the subset of drugs that have been of greatest concern for 
researchers, health professionals, and regulators. Further, to the 
extent that this designation would impose new costs on manufacturers 
of certain drugs, we expect that these manufacturers would either 
bear this cost or seek FDA approval for the use; we do not, in other 
words, anticipate that these prescriptions would universally halt in a 
manner that would be harmful to patients. 
We emphasize that the data underlying such designations (such 
as the percentage of off-label use for certain drugs and the number of 
adverse events) is already well developed in the medical literature for 
a number of drugs, and that the FDA could likely work from existing 
information in choosing which drugs, if any, would be placed into this 
category.140 This suggestion, therefore, would essentially allow the 
FDA to pick its battles, and do so without imposing substantial costs 
on manufacturers and healthcare professionals. 
5. Crowdsourcing Big-Data Analytics.  Together, the mechanisms 
we propose would produce a far more comprehensive picture of the 
scope of off-label use. The collected data would facilitate the FDA’s 
internal analyses, which in turn would improve agency determinations 
related to postmarket testing requirements and enforcement, 
discussed below. 
 
 139. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 111, at 40. 
 140. See generally Laura Cuzzolin, Ada Zaccaron & Vassilios Fanos, Unlicensed and Off-
Label Uses of Drugs in Paediatrics: A Review of the Literature, 17 FUNDAMENTAL & CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 125 (2003) (reviewing the literature concerning off-label uses of pediatric 
drugs). 
ABBOTT AYRES IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2014  8:34 PM 
2014] EVIDENCE AND EXTRAPOLATION 409 
The FDA should also leverage its resources by publishing the 
data it collects in a de-identified manner (that is, without patients’ 
protected health information).141 The dataset that would result from 
our proposed collection activities would have substantial value to a 
range of stakeholders. Government agencies, such as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the National Institutes of 
Health, and the National Science Foundation, study off-label use and 
could use the data collected by the FDA to improve evidence-based 
regulations. This would also be the case with nonprofit organizations, 
such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN). CMS 
and private insurers would utilize the data to make coverage and 
formulary determinations. Academics would use the data for health-
services research. Pharmaceutical companies would have the option 
to do the same to limit their tort liability, and they could use the data 
for new drug development. More ambitiously, to achieve vigorous 
participation, new incentives could be created for private parties to 
supplement the FDA’s activities in this area.142 
B. Improved Testing 
The second element of our proposal is to substantially expand 
the FDA’s use of postmarket testing of off-label drug use. As the 
most basic method to enhance testing of off-label drug use, the FDA 
should more aggressively exercise the authority Congress granted it in 
2007 to require more postmarket testing of off-label drug use, and to 
demand that manufacturers comply with the FDA’s requests for such 
testing. Our primary proposal for improved reporting buttresses this 
recommendation: if the FDA had better information regarding off-
label use, as we suggest it should, it would be in a far better position 
to identify the drugs in need of postmarket testing and far more likely 
to utilize PMRs effectively. 
 
 141. As Professor Ryan Abbott has previously explained: 
The public does not have unrestricted access to the FDA’s data, but the FDA does 
provide the number of reports it has received for products over the past decade, and 
persons familiar with relational database creation can extract raw data from 
individual case safety reports. Also, the public can obtain individual case safety 
reports from FAERS through a Freedom of Information (“FOI”) request to the 
FDA. Finally, the FDA publishes quarterly reports on potential serious side effects 
identified by FAERS and summarizes information about ongoing and completed 
postmarket safety evaluations of adverse experience reports.  
Abbott, supra note 4, at 240 (citations omitted). 
 142. See generally id. (reviewing existing incentives and proposing an administrative bounty 
system to incentivize third parties to submit information to the FDA).  
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The FDA’s decision to require postmarketing testing should be 
guided by a weighing of the following factors:143 
  1. Frequency of off-label use. Here, we suggest that drugs whose 
off-label use represents a substantial percentage—perhaps even a 
majority—of their overall use should attract the attention of 
regulators as likely candidates for postmarket testing.144 
  2. Proximity of off-label use to approved use. Here, we 
recommend a model that looks beyond the frequency of off-label 
use to consider how different those off-label uses are from the 
approved use. Thus, a high frequency of very similar—though off-
label—uses may be less likely to trigger a requirement of postmarket 
testing than a low frequency of very different uses. Put another way, 
an off-label use whose extrapolation is along a continuous variable 
already relevant to the drug’s approval (such as age or weight), and 
small in magnitude, should be less likely to trigger scrutiny than a 
use that introduces an altogether new variable (such as an off-label 
treatment of overactive bladders when the drug is approved for 
treatment of wrinkles and aging145). The logic of including this 
variable is related to our metapoint regarding extrapolation: we 
should have more confidence in the safety of modest (even if 
frequent) extrapolations than dramatic (even if infrequent) ones. 
  3. Frequency of adverse events associated with off-label use. This 
variable is relatively straightforward: a high frequency of adverse 
events should increase the appropriateness of postmarket testing. 
  4. Difference between severity of adverse events associated with 
off-label use and severity of condition if untreated by off-label use. 
Beyond the frequency of the adverse events, we propose a model 
that would weigh adverse events according to their severity. Thus, a 
handful of extremely severe adverse events (such as death) may be 
 
 143. Consistent with our approach, regulators and commentators have discussed and applied 
a variety of risk–benefit principles to new drug approval. See generally, e.g., Louis P. Garrison, 
Jr., Adrian Towse & Brian W. Bresnahan, Assessing a Structured, Quantitative Health Outcomes 
Approach to Drug Risk-Benefit Analysis, 26 HEALTH AFF. 684 (2007) (discussing the current 
risk-benefit framework for new drug approval and proposing an alternative structured 
framework). 
 144. Of course, as we discuss under variable 2, certain drugs have very frequent off-label use 
simply because that use is not so “off-label”—that is, the off-label use differs only very slightly 
from the approved use (for example, use by individuals just outside the approved age range, or 
use at dosages slightly outside the approved range). We do not, therefore, suggest that all drugs 
with heavy off-label use should automatically be subject to extensive postmarket testing; rather, 
by incorporating variable 2 into the analysis, we suspect that many drugs in this category would 
not require postmarket testing because their off-label use is so similar to the approved use. 
 145. See Feeley & Milford, supra note 112. 
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more likely to result in postmarket testing than a large number of 
less severe—yet still reportable—adverse events (such as mild 
headaches). Yet, as the title of this variable suggests, merely looking 
at the severity of adverse events cannot be sufficient. Instead, we 
must compare the severity of what could go wrong with the harm 
from not using the drug for this off-label purpose at all. In essence, 
this requires an evaluation of the potential upside of the use in 
comparison with the potential downside.146 For example, using a 
medication that may relieve acne but has also resulted in some 
serious birth defects would be very likely to trigger a requirement of 
postmarket testing—here, the benefit of off-label use is relatively 
low whereas the cost may be extremely high. By contrast, using a 
drug that may cause heart attacks but has the potential to cure a 
fatal disease would be less likely to trigger testing requirements—
here, the cost of not using the drug for this off-label purpose (death) 
is much greater than the cost of the harms that may result from 
doing so (serious potential side effects). The potential downside 
from the use is small because the patient was already expecting a 
poor outcome. 
  5. Difference in sample size between approved use and off-label 
use. Postmarket testing is more appropriate where the off-label use 
represents an extrapolation into the “hump” of the distribution 
versus into the “tail.” Postmarket testing is more likely to produce 
reliable results—and is thus more appropriate—where the 
population size of off-label users is sufficiently large. When 
extrapolating into the tail of relatively infrequent use, regulators 
without the possibility of credible testing will at times need to make 
the approval decision on the basis of other factors—such as 
proximity and the relative upside of the use—without the benefit of 
additional evidence.147 
By formally considering these variables, and perhaps others, the 
FDA would have a more systematic and effective means of evaluating 
 
 146. For a discussion comparing the expected upside and downside and exploring 
“asymmetric payoffs” and strategies to minimize downside risks while increasing upside risks, 
see NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 157–67 
(2012). 
 147. Note that this variable is distinct from the frequency of off-label use (variable 1). Here, 
our concern is not with how often people actually use a given drug off-label, but rather how 
large the group of potential off-label users might be. Whereas variable 1 expresses a sensitivity 
to the scale of off-label use (and thus to the scale of any potential harm from it), variable 5 
instead focuses on the feasibility of studying off-label use as compared to approved use of a 
drug. 
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whether postmarket testing is necessary.148 The results of applying 
these variables could be surprising: for example, the widespread use 
of a headache drug to cure a minor toe fungus where such use may 
result in stomach pains may be more likely to trigger the requirement 
of postmarket testing than the use of a similar headache drug to cure 
a terminal illness where this use may result in heart attacks. But we 
believe this holistic, multifactor analysis is necessary to optimize 
extrapolation of approved drugs, protect patients, and avoid sinking 
unnecessary costs into studies that are unlikely to meaningfully 
improve patient care. This framework is but one illustration of the 
kind of analysis that the FDA should adopt in evaluating the 
appropriateness of postmarket testing. 
C. Improved Enforcement 
As the final component of our proposal, we call for a tiered 
labeling system to influence off-label prescribing and to enhance the 
FDA’s ability to influence physicians’ prescribing practices. This 
framework would allow the FDA to draw finer distinctions among 
various drug uses, and it would provide the agency both the 
regulatory teeth and the flexibility it presently lacks. A critical benefit 
to these mechanisms is that, once implemented, they would primarily 
rely on third parties and market forces for enforcement, and 
therefore require minimal agency resources. 
Under the model we describe below, unapproved and potentially 
harmful drug uses could be grouped into categories that vary in the 
costs and liabilities they impose on prescribers and manufacturers: (1) 
red-box uses, (2) black-box uses, and (3) gray-box uses. The agency 
could retain unboxed warnings and precautions, and continue its 
practice of simply not listing off-label uses where there is inadequate 
information to support a warning. A new category of conditional off-
label use would allow sponsors actively complying with PMRs and 
PMCs to promote the study to healthcare providers. REMS and 
ETASU could apply to a drug in any category. Table 1 summarizes 




 148. Though we have stopped short of supplying a formula that incorporates these variables, 
we can imagine several possible iterations (for example, where T represents the appropriateness 
of testing, T = a*b + c*d + e). 
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  ✔   
No Warning   ✔   
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Off-Label 
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Check marks indicate the presence of an enforcement mechanism. Shading indicates the extent to which the 
mechanism is present: black (fully present), gray (somewhat present), and white (not present). The REMS 
& ETASU column indicates that FDA use designations could be combined with REMS and ETASU 
requirements. 
 
As Table 1 suggests, a drug use that falls into one of the stronger 
labeling categories is subject not only to its own unique enforcement 
mechanism, but also to downstream enforcement mechanisms 
associated with less stringent labeling categories. For example, both 
red-box and gray-box warnings require a diagnostic code to be 
associated with a prescription. With regard to malpractice liability, 
any off-label use is associated with enhanced liability to the extent it 
differs from the standard of care. However, stricter FDA warnings 
would influence the standard of care both by directly impacting the 
way doctors prescribe, and by serving as evidence of the standard of 
care in malpractice suits. In this way, violating a red-box warning 
would be stronger evidence of malpractice than prescribing off-label 
in the absence of any warning.149 Assignment to labeling categories 
would be facilitated by the improved reporting mechanisms discussed 
previously. 
As the most severe enforcement category, which we might 
consider the “nuclear” option, we propose a new red-box warning 
that would be reserved for the most dangerous and most problematic 
instances of off-label drug use. For the rare uses that would fall within 
this category, physicians and pharmacists would face liability for their 
 
 149. For further background on the increased risk of malpractice liability in the context of 
off-label drug use, including for drugs with black-box warnings, see Judith G. Edersheim & 
Theodore A. Stern, Liability Associated with Prescribing Medications, 11 PRIMARY CARE 
COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 115, 117–18 (2009). 
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roles in making and filling such prescriptions.150 The simplest liability 
mechanism could be a statement to the effect that the FDA considers 
violating a red-box warning conclusive evidence of malpractice and 
grounds for discipline by a state board. This would not guarantee 
practitioner liability, as it would depend on state courts and medical 
boards for enforcement, but it would avoid the need for the agency to 
be responsible for enforcement at the provider level, something it 
does not currently do. State courts and medical boards would have to 
be willing to accept the FDA’s authority in this area, and state 
legislatures would have to acquiesce to and not obstruct the FDA’s 
augmented role. In today’s political environment, it is easy to imagine 
a state legislature passing a law to the effect that providers cannot be 
held liable in state tort suits for violating red-box warnings. This 
possibility is not necessarily fatal to our proposal, as having some 
states challenge red-box warnings would essentially create a 
randomized trial to measure the efficacy of the red-box system. In any 
case, regardless of the extent to which provider liability is enforced by 
third parties, an FDA statement to the effect that a red-box violation 
is malpractice and grounds for discipline is likely to have a very strong 
effect on prescribing practices. More ambitiously, a statutory 
amendment might provide for direct civil liability to the agency. 
Whatever the nature of red-box liability, this category of warnings 
would be designed to completely prohibit particular off-label uses. 
However, in the event that an individual patient had an unusual and 
compelling need that might justify an off-label use in violation of a 
red-box warning, the FDA could consider exceptions on a patient-by-
patient basis with the agency’s approval (similar to the compassionate 
use program).151 
A black-box warning, by contrast, would represent an 
intermediate level of enforcement. In this category, physicians would 
remain free to make such prescriptions, and pharmacists would face 
no special liability for filling them. However, as with black-box 
warnings now, the disclosure would be prominent, and providers 
would be discouraged from violating black-box warnings due to 
 
 150. An example might be the use of thalidomide in a pregnant patient. Margaret Hamburg, 
50 Years After Thalidomide: Why Regulation Matters, FDA VOICE (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/02/50-years-after-thalidomide-why-regulation-
matters. 
 151. See Understanding Expanded Access/Compassionate Use, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ucm20041768.htm (last updated Oct. 
23, 2014) (discussing the FDA’s compassionate use program). 
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malpractice liability. For uses that are not concerning enough to 
prohibit outright with red-box warnings but too concerning to allow 
providers to prescribe routinely, the FDA could combine black-box 
warnings with ETASU requirements. As a novel ETASU mechanism, 
certain uses might require written informed consent from patients for 
the off-label use.152 To the extent that the off-label use in question is 
concerning, requiring informed consent would reduce the prevalence 
of that use because obtaining written informed consent from patients 
is somewhat burdensome on physicians. It would also improve patient 
engagement and education. 
Gray-box warnings would be intended to eliminate insurance 
coverage for particular off-label uses by stating that there is evidence 
that the risks are likely to exceed the benefits for a specific off-label 
use. Gray-box warnings should prevent Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursement. While CMS does not generally reimburse for off-
label use, it may as a result of private compendia or its internal 
analyses. Gray-box warnings, however, should presumptively 
preclude CMS reimbursement, unless CMS makes a deliberate 
decision to the contrary.153 Gray-box warnings would allow the FDA 
to disseminate its internal analyses, along with analyses it collects 
from elsewhere (including from CMS, the European Medicines 
Agency, and academic publications) and validates. This system would 
also promote greater interagency collaboration. A gray-box warning 
is also likely to have a strong impact on private-insurance-
reimbursement decisions, as it works to control healthcare costs, and 
because private-insurance reimbursement often tracks CMS 
reimbursement. 
For any drug with any category of boxed warning, we propose 
that physicians should be required to report diagnostic codes before a 
prescription can be filled. Pharmacies would then be responsible for 
submitting this data to the FDA. For drugs that are concerning 
enough to warrant an off-label boxed warning, it is important that 
 
 152. See REMS and Opioid Analgesics Webinar Outline, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 13, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/UCM163668.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Under the FDA’s ETASU requirements for this class of drugs, the 
prescribing physician must monitor the patient every six months, and the patient must be 
enrolled in a registry. Id. 
 153. Compendia have been criticized as lacking in consistency, quality, transparency, and 
timeliness. Tillman et al., supra note 65, at 349. Reimbursement based on compendia can be 
required by statute, so this particular mechanism may require statutory amendment. R. Dresser 
& J. Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional and Government 
Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009). 
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accurate data be available on the scope of the off-label use. For uses 
that do not warrant a boxed warning, we would retain the existing 
system for unboxed warnings and precautions.154 Of course, not all 
off-label uses are associated with a warning, so the vast majority of 
off-label uses would not be listed on the label or associated with any 
kind of warning (“off-label” in Table 1). 
There is a risk with boxed warnings, particularly with red-box 
warnings, that the FDA will prevent potentially beneficial uses. 
Therefore, these warnings should be implemented sparingly. The risk 
of chilling beneficial uses is significantly less with the use of unboxed 
warnings. The warnings would not be entirely toothless: the 
disclosure requirements would impose additional costs on 
manufacturers and prescribers, and heightened malpractice liability 
would be associated with unapproved use of the drug. But 
enforcement against off-label uses of drugs in this category would be 
significantly less stringent than in boxed categories. Unboxed 
warnings would thus make sense as only one of several effective tools 
in the FDA’s toolbox. This spectrum of regulatory options would 
allow the FDA to better distinguish between high-risk uses and likely 
harmless ones. 
Finally, our enforcement system could be used to improve 
sponsor compliance with agreed-upon postmarket studies using a 
package of the proverbial sticks and carrots. Namely, sponsors 
actively completing PMRs and PMCs would be permitted to inform 
healthcare providers about their studies as part of the “conditional 
off-label” designation.155 This designation would remove the 
promotion bar for discussing off-label uses within the context of the 
clinical trial, and it would be a positive incentive for sponsors to 
conduct trials. In the event a sponsor failed to meet milestones for its 
PMRs and PMCs, such failures would automatically trigger a gray-
box warning, followed eventually by a black-box warning. This system 
would provide a stronger series of incentives for manufacturers to 
 
 154. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED WARNING 
SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – 
CONTENT AND FORMAT (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
ucm075096.pdf. 
 155. This is more liberal than the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, which permitted pharmaceutical companies to 
advertise that they were conducting a clinical trial when it was for the purposes of a new-use 
approval. See id. § 401, 111 Stat. at 2357–58. That regulation has expired. See id., 111 Stat. at 
2364. 
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complete agreed-upon trials, and has the advantage of taking effect 
without a significant additional expenditure of agency resources or 
the need to overcome bureaucratic inertia or make a politically 
contentious determination. However, the agency would have the 
option to postpone or prevent the automatic implementation of a 
boxed warning for good cause. 
III.  ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES: SEROQUEL AND LAP-BAND 
A. The Making of an All-Purpose Psychiatric Drug 
Psychosis is a loss of contact with reality.156 Symptoms of 
psychosis include delusions (false beliefs not amenable to change in 
light of conflicting evidence), hallucinations (perception-like 
experiences that occur without an external stimulus), and 
disorganized thinking.157 Psychotic patients are at risk for agitation, 
aggression, and impulsivity which can make them a danger to 
themselves and others.158 Psychosis can occur as the result of 
underlying mental illness—for example, as a result of schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric disorder involving chronic or recurrent 
psychosis,159 and is one of the top twenty causes of disability 
worldwide.160 Psychosis may also be caused by mental illnesses such as 
bipolar mania or depression with psychotic features.161 It is also 
common in patients with dementia or delirium; up to 40 percent of 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease have psychotic symptoms.162 In 
addition, psychosis can occur as a result of general medical conditions 
or a substance-use disorder.163 Psychosis is relatively common—it 
 
 156. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS § 309.81 (4th ed. 1994).  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Michael D. Jibson, Overview of Psychosis, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/
contents/overview-of-psychosis?source=search_result&search=psychosis&selectedTitle=1%
7E150 (last updated Nov. 1, 2013). 
 160. T. Vos et al., Years Lived with Disability (YLDs) for 1160 Sequelae of 289 Diseases and 
Injuries 1990–2010: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, 380 
LANCET 2163, 2196 (2012). 
 161. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156, at 87–88. 
 162. See Jibson, supra note 159. 
 163. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156, at 87–88. 
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affects more than 3 percent of the population at some point in their 
lives.164 
The primary treatment for psychosis and schizophrenia is 
antipsychotic medications.165 The first generation of these drugs, 
“typical antipsychotics,” was discovered starting in the 1950s.166 These 
drugs are effective, but they also cause significant side effects.167 First-
generation antipsychotics can cause permanent abnormal body 
movements, including tremors and Parkinson’s disease–type 
movements, as well as body rigidity and neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome, a rare but potentially fatal side effect.168 They also cause a 
host of other problems, ranging from sexual dysfunction, to excessive 
sedation, to endocrine disorders.169 These problems are prevalent and 
severe enough that patient noncompliance with directions to use 
typical antipsychotics is common.170 The second generation of 
antipsychotic drugs, “atypical antipsychotics,” was thought to be far 
safer.171 The first atypical antipsychotic agent, Clozapine, was 
marketed heavily on the basis of an improved side-effect profile, as 
were the other atypical antipsychotic agents that followed.172 
Aggressive marketing continued even as evidence emerged that 
contradicted those safety claims.173 For example, a 2005 study in the 
 
 164. See Jonna Perälä et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Psychotic and Bipolar I Disorders in a 
General Population, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 19, 19 (2007). 
 165. See John M. Grohol, Schizophrenia Treatment, PSYCHCENTRAL, http://psychcentral
.com/disorders/sx31t.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2013). 
 166. See Michael D. Jibson, First-Generation Antipsychotic Medications: Pharmacology, 
Administration, and Comparative Side Effects, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/
contents/first-generation-antipsychotic-medications-pharmacology-administration-and-
comparative-side-effects (last updated Mar. 11, 2014); Michael D. Jibson, Second-Generation 
Antipsychotic Medications: Pharmacology, Administration, and Comparative Side Effects, 
UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/second-generation-antipsychotic-medications-
pharmacology-administration-and-comparative-side-effects (last updated Apr. 30, 2014) 
(comparing first- and second-generation antipsychotics).  
 167. See sources cited supra note 166. 
 168. See sources cited supra note 166. 
 169. See PATRICK W. CORRIGAN ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRIC 
REHABILITATION: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 163, 167–68 (2008); John Muench & Ann M. 
Hammer, Adverse Effects of Antipsychotic Medications, 81 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 617, 619–21 
(2010). 
 170. See Ghaseen Saba et al., Patients’ Health Literacy in Psychotic Disorders, 3 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 511, 511 (2007). 
 171. See sources cited supra note 166. 
 172. See Herbert Y. Meltzer, Clozapine: Balancing Safety with Superior Antipsychotic 
Efficacy, CLINICAL SCHIZOPHRENIA & RELATED PSYCHOSES, Oct. 2012, at 134, 135–36. 
 173. See id. 
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New England Journal of Medicine showed that the increase in the risk 
of death for elderly patients taking atypical antipsychotic agents was 
on par with that associated with taking typical antipsychotic agents.174 
On the basis of a review of the existing evidence in 2008, the editors 
of the Lancet concluded that “the time has come to abandon the 
terms first-generation and second-generation antipsychotics, as they do 
not merit this distinction.”175 
Seroquel (one of the brand names for the generic drug 
quetiapine fumarate) is a second-generation antipsychotic 
manufactured by AstraZeneca that was approved by the FDA in 
1997.176 It is now approved for the treatment of schizophrenia and 
mania-associated bipolar disorder, and Seroquel XR (the extended-
release iteration of the drug) is approved for adjunct treatment of 
major depressive disorder (MDD).177 Over its lifetime, Seroquel has 
been subject to sixty-one labeling revisions, efficacy-supplement 
additions, patient-population alterations, packaging changes, and 
indication modifications.178 In 2009, a black-box warning was added to 
advise that elderly patients with dementia-related psychosis treated 
with Seroquel are at an increased risk of death, and that Seroquel 
increases the risk of suicide in young persons.179 Those risks apply to 
 
 174. Philip S. Wang, Sebastian Schneeweiss, Jerry Avorn, Michael A. Fischer, Helen 
Mogun, Daniel H. Solomon & M. Alan Brookhart, Risk of Death in Elderly Users of 
Conventional vs. Atypical Antipsychotic Medications, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2335, 2335 (2005). 
 175. Peter Tyrer & Tim Kendall, The Spurious Advance of Antipsychotic Drug Therapy, 373 
LANCET 4, 5 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LABEL AND APPROVAL HISTORY, DRUGS@FDA: 
FDA APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.DrugDetails (search for “SEROQUEL”; then follow 
“SEROQUEL”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (“Original Approval . . . Date September 26, 1997”). 
 177. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: 
SEROQUEL (QUETIAPINE FUMARATE) TABLETS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata
.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/020639s061lbl.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: SEROQUEL XR (QUETIAPINE FUMARATE) 
TABLETS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/
022047s034lbl.pdf. 
 178. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176.  
 179. Drug Safety Labeling Changes: Seroquel (quetiapine fumarate) Tablets August 2008, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/Safety-
RelatedDrugLabelingChanges/ucm123259.htm (last updated June 19, 2009) (“Warning: 
Increased Mortality in Elderly Patients with Dementia-Related Psychosis—Elderly patients 
with dementia-related psychosis treated with antipsychotic drugs are at an increased risk of 
death. . . . SEROQUEL is not approved for the treatment of patients with dementia-related 
psychosis.”). 
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the entire class of atypical antipsychotics.180 Also in 2009, the FDA 
required AstraZeneca to implement a REMS for Seroquel, which 
required a medication guide and periodic assessments that included a 
survey of patients’ understanding of the potential risks of Seroquel, 
including mortality in the elderly, hyperglycemia, 
hypercholesterolemia, and weight gain.181 The REMS was “released” 
(discontinued) in November 2011.182 However, the FDA continues to 
require the medication guide as part of the approved labeling for 
Seroquel.183 
Off-label uses of Seroquel are common—and troubling. For 
example, the AHRQ found that “at one large acute-care psychiatric 
hospital, [Seroquel] was used extensively for off-label conditions, and 
in a variety of off-label doses.”184 Moreover, “only a quarter of 
patients had one of the diagnoses for which [Seroquel] is approved, 
and only a third received [Seroquel] in a standing dose regimen. 
Depression and substance-use disorders were found to be the most 
common associated diagnoses.”185 Other off-label uses are for sleep 
disorders, anxiety, autism, panic attacks, headaches, restlessness, 
nervousness, dementia, and agitation.186 An investigation of Florida’s 
Department of Juvenile Justice found that the agency bought twice as 
much Seroquel as Ibuprofen in 2007, “routinely [doling it] out for 
reasons that never were approved by federal regulators.”187 Military 
spending on Seroquel has increased “more than sevenfold” since 
2001, as veterans’ doctors frequently prescribe it for insomnia and 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. FDA Approves Once-Daily SEROQUEL XR Extended Release Tablets, NEWS MED. 
(Dec. 4, 2009, 7:37 AM), http://www.news-medical.net/news/20091204/FDA-approves-once-
daily-SEROQUEL-XR-Extended-Release-Tablets.aspx.  
 182. Postmarket Drug Safety Information for Patients and Providers: Released REMS, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafety
InformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm393231.htm (last updated Aug. 12, 2014). 
 183. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RELEASE REMS REQUIREMENT 2 (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2011/020639s055ltr.pdf.  
 184. Margaret Maglione et al., Off-Label Use of Atypical Antipsychotics: An Update, 43 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS REVIEWS 20 (2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
n/cer43/pdf/.  
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 29–33 (listing treatment for a variety of conditions, some involving off-label 
uses of antipsychotics).  
 187. Michael LaForgia, Huge Doses of Potent Antipsychotics Flow into State Jails for 
Troubled Kids, PALM BEACH POST, May 24, 2011, at 1A. 
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post-traumatic stress disorder.188 The Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices found that 47 percent of the adverse events from 2004 to 
2010 occurred when the drug was being used off-label.189 Off-label 
uses of Seroquel also occur in violation of its black-box warning. 
Elderly patients with dementia continue to receive Seroquel in 
significant numbers, despite the evidence of increased risk of death 
and the availability of alternate treatment options such as mood 
stabilizers.190 As of 2010, a study found that it was still the case that 
almost “10% of prescription drug uses for dementia among elderly 
patients are for atypical antipsychotics.”191 
The prevalence of Seroquel’s off-label uses should not be 
surprising, because AstraZeneca promoted the drug aggressively for 
such uses.192 As Seroquel became increasingly profitable, AstraZeneca 
even engineered deliberately misleading promotions.193 The company 
promoted the drug as better than generic without scientific evidence, 
and as weight-neutral despite knowing that Seroquel caused weight 
 
 188. Matthew Perrone, Deaths Raise Questions on Drug Given to Sleepless Vets, NBC 
NEWS, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38917668/ns/health-mental_health/t/deaths-
raise-questions-drug-given-sleepless-vets/. 
 189. Jim Edwards, How Seroquel, a Risky Antipsychotic, Became a “General Purpose” 
Mental Health Drug, CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 27, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/how-seroquel-a-risky-antipsychotic-became-a-general-purpose-mental-health-drug. 
 190. Sudeep S. Gill et al., Antipsychotic Drug Use and Mortality in Older Adults with 
Dementia, 146 ANN. INTERN. MED. 775, 775 (2007). 
 191. Dorsey et al., supra note 98, at 101. In 2003, there were 590,000 drug uses in which 
atypical antipsychotics were used among individuals sixty-five years and older with dementia. 
Id. at 99. That number peaked in 2004 at 780,000 uses, then declined to 400,000 in 2008 (the last 
year examined in the study). Id. The study concluded that the black-box warning decreased use 
of the medication. Id. at 96. Still, the use of atypical antipsychotics for dementia continues. Id. 
The study also noted that the most recent figures on new atypical antipsychotic prescriptions, 
from December 2008, showed “there were 8000 new atypical drug uses each month among 
patients with dementia, despite the increased risk of death and limited evidence of their 
efficacy.” Id. at 101. 
 192. Edwards, supra note 189. 
 193.  Duff Wilson, For $520 Million, AstraZeneca Settles Case over Marketing of a Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/28drug.html 
(“‘AstraZeneca paid kickbacks to doctors as part of an illegal scheme to market drugs for 
unapproved uses,’ Kathleen Sebelius, secretary of health and human services, said . . . .”). 
Moreover, 
From 2004 to 2008, the mean cost of typical antipsychotic prescription increased 8% 
from $38 to $41, while the cost of an atypical prescription increased by 43% from 
$226 to $323. In 2008, US $0.06 billion was spent on typical agents and $9.9 billion 
spent on atypical agents in the United States. Given these costs, we estimate that in 
2008 $6.0 billion was expended on off-label use of antipsychotic medications, of which 
$5.4 billion was for uses with uncertain evidence. 
Alexander et al., supra note 40, at 181. 
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gain.194 Seroquel became a “general purpose psychiatric drug.”195 
AstraZeneca’s promotion campaign was enormously successful, and 
Seroquel earned $4.87 billion for the company in 2009.196 Although 
total AstraZeneca earnings stood at $33 billion in 2010, Seroquel 
sales made up 40 percent of the company’s pretax profit.197 The pretax 
profit margin on Seroquel sales exceeded 80 percent.198 
Eventually, AstraZeneca was sued by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) for promoting off-label uses.199 The DOJ settled its case for 
$520 million in 2009, noting, “the company recruited doctors to serve 
as authors of articles that were ghostwritten by medical literature 
companies . . . about studies the doctors in question did not conduct. 
AstraZeneca then used those studies and articles as the basis for 
promotional messages about unapproved uses of Seroquel.”200 The 
company was also sued by numerous patients.201 In 2010, AstraZeneca 
settled two-thirds of the lawsuits against them for a total of $198 
million.202 However, perverse incentives are at work: the drug was so 
profitable that even after the FDA required the company to warn 
 
 194. Jim Edwards, E-Mail: AstraZeneca Knew in 1997 That Seroquel Caused Weight Gain, 
CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/e-mail-
astrazeneca-knew-in-1997-that-seroquel-caused-weight-gain (“AstraZeneca knew as far back as 
1997 that Seroquel put patients at risk of weight gain, according to the company’s own internal 
memos. The documents also appear to show that some [AstraZeneca] executives developed 
strategies to ‘neutralize’ [the claim that] Seroquel caused weight gain or diabetes, even after the 
FDA asked the company to warn patients about Seroquel’s diabetes side effect.”); see also Jim 
Edwards, The Dog Ate AstraZeneca’s Homework! Evidence on Misleading Drug Ad Disappears 
from Company’s Files, CBS MONEY WATCH (July 10, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www
.cbsnews.com/news/the-dog-ate-astrazenecas-homework-evidence-on-misleading-drug-ad-
disappears-from-companys-files (“AstraZeneca (AZN) says it has lost a crucial internal 
document that would explain how an ad for its antipsychotic Seroquel misleadingly claimed 
there was ‘no weight gain’ with the drug and described its ‘favorable weight profile.’”).  
 195. Edwards, supra note 189. 
 196. Jim Edwards, AstraZeneca’s Marketing Strategy: Sue Us, Please!, CBS MONEY WATCH 
(Aug. 5, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/astrazenecas-marketing-strategy-sue-
us-please. 
 197. Jim Edwards, How a Single Patent Expiry Could Wipe Out 40% of AstraZeneca’s 
Profits, CBS MONEY WATCH (Feb. 7, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-a-
single-patent-expiry-could-wipe-out-40-of-astrazenecas-profits. 
 198. Id. 
 199. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca To Pay $520 Million for 
Off-label Drug Marketing (2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Edwards, supra note 196. 
 202. Id. 
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that Seroquel may cause diabetes203 the company continued to use 
promotional materials without the warning.204 Financially, it worked 
out that it was more profitable to continue with misleading 
advertisements and to settle civil claims than to provide accurate 
information to potential users.205 
B. The Seroquel Dynamic Extrapolation Approach 
Seroquel can illustrate the advantages of our proposed 
framework. However, this Section is only intended to highlight key 
considerations and broad policy options; definitive determinations 
related to testing and labeling requirements would require a far more 
detailed evaluation. 
The case of Seroquel raises two primary extrapolation-related 
issues: First, should Seroquel be used for unapproved conditions, and 
if so, which conditions? For example, should it be used for anxiety or 
dementia or post-traumatic stress disorder? Second, should Seroquel 
be used in different populations than those for which it was originally 
approved? In other words, should it be used in very young or very old 
populations, or in the pregnant-women population, none of which 
were examined in the original preapproval process? Other 
extrapolation issues include duration of use and substitution: Should 
Seroquel be prescribed for a longer time period than the duration of 
treatment evaluated in preapproval testing? Should it be used 
indefinitely when there is limited information available about long-
term use? Can Seroquel XR safely be used in place of Seroquel? 
To evaluate all of these extrapolation issues, our approach begins 
with data collection. For a new drug, this would include only 
preapproval clinical data, or data available from foreign countries if 
the drug has already been in use outside the United States. For a drug 
like Seroquel that has been in use for about fifteen years since its 
initial FDA approval, observational data will be available for each 
individual extrapolation. However, the data currently available to the 
agency is inferior to the data that would be available under the 
collection system we propose. Unfortunately, because the data we 
 
 203. Letter from Michelle Safarik, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug Marketing, 
Adver., & Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to James L. Gaskill, Dir., Promotional 
Regulatory Affairs, AstraZeneca LP (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyF
DA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM221315.pdf. 
 204. Id.; Edwards, supra note 196. 
 205. Edwards, supra note 196.  
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advocate the FDA to collect is not available, it cannot be used here to 
demonstrate how it would affect downstream decisions related to 
testing and labeling. Our case study is restricted to the data currently 
available. Still, under the collection system we propose, regulators 
would have a far-clearer picture of Seroquel’s off-label use. Because 
Seroquel has a boxed warning, under our framework physicians 
would be required to report the indication for which the drug is being 
prescribed. 
With regard to postmarket studies, each extrapolation requires 
its own analysis. Our case-study analysis will focus on an off-label use 
that has been particularly concerning to regulators: using Seroquel for 
dementia-related psychosis in elderly patients. In fact, that off-label 
use is a combination of two distinct extrapolations, as the drug is 
being prescribed for an unapproved use (dementia) and in an 
unstudied population (geriatric patients). Combining multiple 
extrapolations has the potential to create safety problems that might 
not exist with either extrapolation in isolation. In the case of this 
combined extrapolation, the following factors would support an 
argument in favor of additional testing: a substantial percentage of 
Seroquel’s overall use was off-label, as well as used off-label 
specifically for dementia and geriatric treatment; Seroquel’s off-label 
use occurred, in part, across discrete conditions (schizophrenia versus 
dementia); adverse events were relatively frequent (for example, 
there was a greater than 5 percent incidence of weight gain) and 
severe (for example, the risk of death for Seroquel users rose to 
between 1.6 to 1.7 times the risk of death in placebo-treated patients); 
and, there is a large population of off-label users. Mitigating the need 
for postmarket testing would be the fact that Seroquel treats 
symptoms of dementia, which are serious, and that the off-label use 
here was in part along a continuous variable (age). 
The factor-weighing analysis here supports requiring postmarket 
testing. This type of analysis would be an ongoing process for each 
extrapolation, so when data collection or surveillance reveals, for 
example, a higher incidence of off-label use for geriatric patients, that 
might alter the calculus enough to trigger the need for a postmarket 
study. A determination as to what type of study or methodology the 
FDA should mandate where analysis supports requiring 
postmarketing testing is beyond the scope of this analysis. In general, 
the FDA could require studies ranging from randomized clinical trials 
to prospective or retrospective cohort studies (in which a population 
is followed forward or backward in time). A randomized controlled 
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trial would produce the strongest results, but would need to be 
balanced against the reality that controlled trials are more resource 
intensive, and that it would be impracticable to require a controlled 
trial for every possible extrapolation.206 Moreover, such trials may 
sometimes be unethical: given what is now known about the increased 
risk of death in elderly patients using Seroquel, it would be unethical 
to expose such patients to a controlled trial. Earlier in the drug’s 
lifecycle, however, that risk was not yet clear: a trial may well have 
averted the ultimate harm done by the continued unchecked use of 
the drug in that population. Ultimately, the risk was established in a 
meta-analysis of seventeen placebo-controlled trials of atypical 
antipsychotic drugs.207 Regardless of the nature of the postmarket 
testing, if the agency is going to permit continued use without 
warning, additional study is required. 
With regard to labeling, should the FDA require ETASU or a 
red-box warning? In 2010, the AHRQ evaluated thirty-eight trials on 
dementia, six of which compared Seroquel to a placebo. The meta-
analysis found a positive, significant difference between the atypical 
antipsychotics as a class and the placebo, though the effect was small 
in magnitude.208 The pooled estimate of effect for Seroquel was not 
statistically significant.209 This evidence suggests that Seroquel is not 
effective at treating symptoms associated with dementia in elderly 
patients. On the other hand, the AHRQ analysis found “high strength 
evidence from meta-analyses that the use of atypical antipsychotics is 
associated with an increased risk of death in elderly patients with 
dementia and agitation.” In other words, there is no evidence of 
benefit, but strong evidence of an increased risk of death. On that 
basis, the FDA should issue a red-box warning for this off-label use. 
Even under the best of circumstances, FDA analysis and 
decisionmaking will not be perfect. Where the risk–benefit analysis is 
not clear enough to support a red-box warning, a black- or gray-box 
warning will be more appropriate. Further, when the FDA 
implements a red-box warning, or withdraws a drug altogether, the 
agency should continue monitoring any available data. That may 
 
 206. See Robert William Sanson-Fisher et al., Limitations of the Randomized Controlled 
Trial in Evaluating Population-Based Health Interventions, 30 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 155, 
156–58 (2007). 
 207. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 176. 
 208. Maglione et al., supra note 184, at 117.  
 209. Id. 
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occur, for example, if the drug continues to be used in foreign 
countries.210 In the event subsequent evidence alters the factors 
weighed by the agency to make labeling determinations, the FDA 
may need to revise its initial determination in light of an evolving 
evidence base. 
C. 1-800-GET-THIN! 
The Lap-Band Adjustable Gastric Banding System (“Lap-
Band”) is a medical device manufactured by Allergan to promote 
weight loss in obese patients. Obesity is determined by body mass 
index (BMI), which is calculated by dividing a patient’s weight (in 
kilograms) by the square of the patient’s height (in meters).211 The 
Lap-Band “restrict[s] the size of the stomach to promote early satiety 
and appetite control leading to weight loss.”212 Typically the device is 
placed via laparoscopic adjustable gastric banding (LAGB) surgery: 
“an inflatable gastric band connected to a reservoir port” is 
“implanted to encircle the top portion of the upper stomach creating 
a smaller stomach pouch.”213 The Lap-Band can then be adjusted by 
deflating or further inflating the band with saline. In the event of 
complications or ineffectiveness, the Lap-Band can be removed. The 
removal procedure is typically laparoscopic—some can even be 
performed through a single incision.214 
 
 210. This would present an opportunity for greater international cooperation among the 
FDA and foreign regulatory agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency, and 
international organizations, such as the World Health Organization. Similar initiatives have long 
been a goal for much of the international community. Ryan Abbott, Overcoming Barriers to a 
Global Treaty on Medical Funding and R&D, J. BRAZ. INST. FOR INTEL. PROP 70, 70–76 (2012). 
 211. The following metric is used to categorize patients: Underweight (<18.5 kg/m2), Normal 
(18.5 to 24.9 kg/m2), Overweight (25 to 29.9 kg/m2), Obesity I (30 to 43.9 kg/m2), Obesity II (35 
to 39.9 kg/m2), and Extreme Obesity (> 40 kg/m2). See NAT’L HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INST., 
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, 
AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE REPORT xiv 
(1998), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf. There are limits on the utility 
of BMI measurements, which do not, for example, account for muscularity or frame size. Id. 
 212. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE IMPACT 
OF WEIGHT LOSS FROM ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BANDING ON DIABETES, HYPERTENSION, AND 
DYSLIPIDEMIA 1 (2000). 
 213. Id. 
 214. While a majority of Lap-Band removal surgeries are laparoscopic, a sizeable minority 
of patients undergoing removal surgery have to undergo “open” surgery, with a larger incision 
and recovery time. Risks Associated with the Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Band, MUSC 
HEALTH, http://www.muschealth.com/weightlosssurgery/about/procedures/laprisks.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2014) (“Laparoscopic surgery is not always possible. The surgeon may need to 
switch to an ‘open’ method . . . .”). 
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Research suggests that the Lap-Band is effective in promoting 
weight loss. The Lap-Band was approved in part on the basis of a 
three-year, prospective, multicenter, nonrandomized trial with 299 
subjects.215 That study found that obese patients lost an average of 60 
to 70 percent of their excess weight within one year after their Lap-
Band surgery.216 Eighty percent of all patients lost at least 30 percent 
of their excess weight and kept it off for one year.217 In 2008, a meta-
analysis evaluated 104 studies with more than 24,000 patients and 
found that patients’ mean excess-weight loss three years after Lap-
Band surgery was 50.2 percent.218 The authors concluded that “gastric 
banding meta-analysis provided evidence that, as a bariatric 
procedure, LAGB safely achieves clinically significant, durable 
weight loss and comorbidity improvement.”219 In addition to being 
effective, the Lap-Band represented a significant improvement over 
prior, more invasive bariatric surgical options, which permanently 
reduced the size of the stomach and shortened the intestines.220 A 
2005 meta-analysis of 147 studies on surgical treatment of obesity 
compared the most common gastric bypass procedure (Roux-en-Y 
gastric bypass) with gastric band surgery.221 The patients who 
 
 215. The mean excess-weight loss (EWL) one year post–Lap-Band for patients whose 
starting BMI was equal to, or greater than, 35 was 60.88 percent with comorbidities and 61.65 
percent without comorbidities; the EWL for patients with a BMI less than 35 was 69.34 percent 
with comorbidities and 67.57 percent without comorbidities. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
THE LAP-BAND ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BANDING SYSTEM, SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS DATA, at 28 tbl.16 (2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/
pdf/P000008S017b.pdf. The total sample size was 149 patients: 56 patients had a BMI less than 
35 with comorbidities; 8 patients had a BMI less than 35 without comorbidities; 71 patients had 
a BMI of 35 or more with comorbidities patients; and 14 patients had a BMI of 35 or more 
without comorbidities. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Expands Use of Banding System for 
Weight Loss (Feb. 16, 2011). The FDA used the 1983 Metropolitan Life Insurance Tables to 
determine “estimated ideal weight,” instructing users to “use the midpoint for medium frame.” 
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215, at 1. 
 218. Scott A. Cunneen, Review of Meta-Analytic Comparisons of Bariatric Surgery with a 
Focus on Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Banding, 4 SURG. FOR OBES. AND RELAT. DIS. S47–
S55, S49 (2008). 
 219. Id. 
 220. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215. Two types of gastric bands have been 
approved for use in the United States: the Lap-Band Gastric Banding System and the Realize 
Gastric Band. Obesity Treatment Devices: FDA Approved Obesity Treatment Devices, U.S. 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/ObesityDevices/ucm350134.htm (last updated July 8, 2014). 
 221. Melinda A. Maggard et al., Meta-Analysis: Surgical Treatment of Obesity, 142 ANN. 
INTERN. MED. 547, 547–59 (2005). 
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underwent gastric bypass had a mortality rate of 0.3 percent across 
case series, whereas those who had gastric banding had a 0.02 percent 
mortality rate.222 However, Lap-Band does cause a high rate of 
adverse events. Complications affect a majority of those who have a 
Lap-Band implanted: “more than 70 percent of patients experienced 
an adverse event related to LAP-BAND, most often vomiting and 
difficulty swallowing. The events ranged from mild to severe but most 
were mild and resolved quickly.”223 Other potential problems include 
infection, port-related complications, slippage, pouch dilation, 
stomach ischemia, and erosion.224 A 2011 search of the FDA adverse-
events database for Lap-Bands revealed more than eight-thousand 
adverse-event reports, including eighty deaths.225 
The Lap-Band became available outside the United States in 
July 1994, and the FDA approved domestic clinical trials in 1995.226 
An estimated fifty thousand patients received a Lap-Band outside the 
United States227 prior to its FDA approval in 2001.228 As a condition of 
approval, the product sponsor agreed to continue tracking patients 
from the approval trials for a total of five years of follow up.229 
Initially, the FDA approved Lap-Bands only in “severely obese 
patients with a Body Mass Index (BMI) of at least 40 or a BMI of at 
least 35 with one or more severe comorbid conditions, or those who 
are 100 lbs. or more over their estimated ideal weight.”230 Additional 
criteria included a documented history of failed conservative weight-
 
 222. Id. at 553 (“The early mortality rate for RYGB was 1.0% (95% CI, 0.5% to 1.9%) in 
controlled trials and 0.3% (CI, 0.2% to 0.4%) for case series data. Adjustable gastric banding 
had an associated early mortality rate of 0.4% (CI, 0.01% to 2.1%) for controlled trials and 
0.02% (97.5% CI, 0% to 0.78%) for case series data.”). 
 223. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 217. 
 224. Sandra Arthurs, Yerado Abrahamian, Elizabeth L. Loughren, Jo Carol Hiatt, Robin 
Cisneros & Jed Weissberg, New Technology Review Process: The Laparoscopic Adjustable 
Gastric Band, 15 THE PERMANENTE J. 4, 56 (Fall 2011).  
 225. Id. 
 226. M. Belachew, M. J. Legrand & V. Vincent, History of Lap-Band®: From Dream to 
Reality, 11 OBESITY SURGERY 297, 301–02 (2001). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Letter from Daniel G. Schultz, Deputy Dir. for Clinical and Review Policy, to Ellen 
Duke, President and Chief Exec. Officer, BioEnterics Corp. (Mar. 24, 2000) (amended Apr. 20, 
2000; May 3, 2000; Dec. 26, 2000; May 18, 2001; and June 1, 2001), http://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf/p000008a.pdf. 
 229. Id. (“You agreed to continue follow-up on subjects enrolled . . . [in] your 
investigational study. These post-approval subjects must be followed for a total of 5 years from 
the time of implantation. . . . The results of the post-approval study should be reflected in the 
labeling via a PMA supplement when the study is complete.”). 
 230. Id. 
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reduction alternatives and a lifetime commitment to change one’s 
eating habits.231 The FDA expressed caution in its letter of approval, 
stating that the Lap-Band should be a last resort.232 It was not until 
February 2011 that the FDA expanded the use of the Lap-Band to 
patients with BMIs as low as 30 if they presented with severe 
conditions such as heart disease or diabetes, which put them at the 
“highest risk of obesity-related complications.”233 This was narrower 
than the indication originally sought by Allergan, which had proposed 
expanding use of the Lap-Band to patients with BMIs from 35 to 39 
without obesity-related conditions.234 The Lap-Band is still not 
recommended “for non-adult patients, patients with conditions that 
may make them poor surgical candidates or increase the risk of poor 
results . . . who are unwilling or unable to comply with the required 
dietary restrictions, who have alcohol or drug addictions, or who 
currently are or may be pregnant.”235 
Since the device’s approval, there has been strong consumer 
demand for off-label use.236 That is evidenced, for example, by the 
agency’s difficulties contending with “pop-up”–type ambulatory 
surgical firms marketing aggressively and promising unrealistic results 
with little to no mention of accompanying dietary restrictions, post-
surgical compliance, or the Lap-Band’s potential complications. For 
example, one weight-loss-surgery business used a “1-800-GET-
THIN” marketing campaign in Southern California.237 That campaign 
utilized advertisements inserts such as “LOSE WEIGHT WITH THE 
LAP-BAND! SAFE 1 HOUR, FDA APPROVED,” “Celebrate 
Black History Month! Let Your New Life Begin! 1-800-GET-THIN,” 
 
 231. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 215. 
 232. Letter from Daniel G. Schultz, Deputy Dir. for Clinical and Review Policy, to Ellen 
Duke, President and Chief Exec. Officer, BioEnterics Corp., supra note 228. 
 233. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra note 217. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Find a LAP-BAND® Specialist, LAP-BAND SYSTEM, http://www.lapband.com/find-a-
specialist (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 236. In one study of “208 participants . . . 49 (23.6%) rated appearance, 18 (8.7%) 
embarrassment, 49 (23.6%) medical condition, 59 (28.4%) health concerns, 13 (6.3%) physical 
fitness and 20 (9.6%) physical limitation as the most appropriate motivational statement.” 
Marije Libeton, John B. Dixon, Cheryl Laurie & Paul E. O’Brien, Patient Motivation for 
Bariatric Surgery: Characteristics and Impact on Outcomes, 14 OBES. SURG. 392, 392 (2004). 
 237. See Letter from Steven D. Silverman, Dir. of the Office of Compliance of the Ctr. for 
Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Robert Silverman, Esq., of 1-
800-GET-THIN, LLC (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforcement
Actions/WarningLetters/ucm283312.htm (describing various violations related to advertising 
campaigns run by 1-800-GET-THIN). 
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and promising testimonials, such as “MARCIANO LOST 125 
POUNDS.”238 That group claimed that facilities associated with the 
campaign were “bringing in $21 million a month” in revenue.239 On 
December 11, 2011, the FDA cautioned the group behind “1-800-
GET-THIN” that its advertisements “fail to reveal material facts, 
including relevant risk information regarding the use of the Lap-
Band, age and other qualifying requirements for the Lap-Band 
procedure, and the need for the ongoing modification of eating 
habits, as provided in the approved Lap-Band labeling.”240 That same 
day, several such notices were also sent to related groups heavily 
promoting the Lap-Band.241 
D. The Lap-Band Dynamic Extrapolation Approach 
The Lap-Band presents numerous regulatory extrapolation 
challenges. First, at what BMI should the Lap-Band be used? Was the 
FDA too cautious in its earlier BMI indications? Is it still being too 
cautious? Should comorbidities be required at lower BMIs? Is there a 
legitimate rationale for approval for a BMI of 40 but not 39? Second, 
in what populations should the Lap-Band be used? Should it be 
approved in pediatric populations?242 Is there an age after which the 
risks of the device outweigh the benefits? Should it be used in 
pregnant patients? Should it be used in patients who have 
comorbidities (for example, a history of mental illness) that cause 
them to be excluded from clinical trials? Third, should the Lap-Band 
be used indefinitely given that the device was only studied for five 
years? Fourth, should alternative medical devices, such as the Realize 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Stuart Pfeifer, 800-GET-THIN Probe Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-omidi-search-warrant-20140605-story.html. 
 240. Letter from Steven D. Silverman, Dir. of the Office of Compliance of the Ctr. for 
Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Maria Abaca, of Beverly 
Hills Surgery Center LLC (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforcement
Actions/WarningLetters/ucm283310.htm. 
 241. Stuart Pfeifer, Duke Helfand & W.J. Hennigan, FDA Accuses 1-800-GET-THIN of 
Using Misleading Lap-Band Ads, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes
.com/2011/dec/14/business/la-fi-lap-band-fda-20111214. 
 242. Lap Band is not currently FDA-approved for use in patients younger than eighteen. 
Mikaela Conlet, Lap Band Surgery: Allergan Asks FDA to Approve Obesity Surgery for Teens, 
ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/lap-band-maker-allergan-hopes-
offer-surgery-teens/story?id=13678820. 
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Band, which is manufactured by Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,243 be 
approved based on data for the Lap-Band? 
Our Lap-Band case study will discuss only a few of these 
extrapolation issues: duration of treatment, follow-on device 
approval, and BMI indication. Again, our approach begins with data 
collection. Extrapolation determinations would be improved with 
data that has not been systematically collected or analyzed, but that 
would have been under our framework. 
With regard to duration of treatment, there is currently no 
evidence that would support limiting the Lap-Band’s duration. 
Moreover, limiting the device’s duration of treatment would require a 
second surgery to remove the device. At present, clinical guidelines 
suggest Lap-Band patients should be seen by a physician three to 
eight times the first year, one to four times the second year, and one 
to two times every year thereafter.244 However, given that patients are 
using this device indefinitely and that the device has been studied 
only for five years in a controlled setting, our framework would place 
a burden on the manufacturer to continue patient follow-up from 
controlled trials indefinitely. Such follow-up might detect new risks 
that emerge more than five years after device implantation, or it 
might find that known risks become more prevalent years after device 
implantation. That evidence would be collected and analyzed 
together with a more robust dataset from clinical practice. At present, 
there is inadequate safety data for the Lap-Band in light of its actual 
duration of use.245 
Lap-Band data was appropriately extrapolated to the Realize 
Adjustable Gastric Band. The Realize Band, manufactured by 
Ethicon, has been marketed in Europe since 1996.246 It became 
available to the European Union and other countries, excluding the 
United States, in 2004.247 It was then approved by the FDA on 
 
 243. REALIZE Adjustable Gastric Band, ETHICON ENDO-SURGERY, INC. (2009), 
http://www.ethicon.com/sites/default/files/loose-documents/09-1089.pdf. 
 244. S. Sauerland et al., Obesity Surgery: Evidence-Based Guidelines of the European 
Association for Endoscopic Surgery (E.A.E.S.), 19 SURGICAL ENDOSCOPY 200, 200–21 (2005). 
 245. Arthurs et al., supra note 224, at 56. 
 246. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REALIZE ADJUSTABLE GASTRIC BAND, SUMMARY OF 
SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DATA 4 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/MedicalDevices/MedicalDevicesAdvisory
Committee/Gastroenterology-UrologyDevicesPanel/UCM302775.pdf. 
 247. Id. 
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September 28, 2007.248 Its parameters resemble the original Lap-Band 
indications: a BMI of 40 or greater, or a BMI of 35 or greater plus a 
comorbidity.249 In addition to a review of Lap-Band data and data 
from the Realize Band’s international use, the FDA required a three-
year U.S. clinical study. That study implanted the Realize Band in 276 
patients with at least a five-year history of morbid obesity who had 
exhausted nonsurgical weight-reduction efforts.250 The results and 
adverse events were comparable to those of the Lap-Band.251 The 
FDA also required a postapproval study with five years of follow-
up.252 Given a lack of evidence to suggest a clinical difference between 
the Lap-Band and the Realize Band, it would appear appropriate for 
the FDA to approve the Realize Band for the same indications as the 
Lap-Band, but to require Ethicon to continue monitoring its trial 
patients. Expanded data collection will be able to alert the FDA to 
risks if a significant difference emerges between the two devices in 
practice. 
Determining the appropriate BMI indication is more 
challenging. The following factors are relevant: First, the amount of 
off-label use has not been well quantified, but there are indications 
that Lap-Band was commonly used outside of its approved BMI.253 
Second, off-label use here is along a continuous variable (BMI) and 
small in magnitude. Third, adverse events were relatively frequent 
and ranged from mild to severe. Fourth, there is a large population of 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Realize Patient Guide, ETHICON ENDO-SURGERY, available at https://www
.jnjgatewayifu.com/eLabelingContent/Ees/USENG/IFU_74120_Rev_A_REALIZE_PATIENT
_GUIDE_44365.pdf (2008). 
 250. All were at least one-hundred pounds overweight or 1.5 times their ideal body weight 
(IBW), from eighteen to sixty years of age, with a BMI greater than or equal to 40, or a BMI of 
35 and an obesity-related comorbidity. Subjects were observed for three years: their mean EWL 
was 38 percent after one year; 44.7 percent after two years, and 41.1 percent at the end of the 
three years. The trial defined comorbidities as “type 2 diabetes, hyperlipidemia, obstructive 
sleep apnea, hypertension, metabolic syndrome, or osteoarthritis of the hip or knee” that “were 
generally expected to be improved, reversed, or resolved by weight loss.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 246, at 15. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., Kathleen Doheny, Bariatric Surgery Helps People Who Are Less Obese, 
WEBMD (June 16, 2011), http://www.webmd.com/diet/weight-loss-surgery/news/20110616/
study-bariatric-surgery-works-for-less-obese-people; T.H. Inge, S.A. Xanthakos & M.H. Zeller, 
Bariatric Surgery for Pediatric Extreme Obesity: Now or Later?, 31 INT’L J. OBESITY 1 (2007); 
Paul E. O’Brien et al., Laparoscopic Adjustable Gastric Banding in Severely Obese Adolescents: 
A Randomized Trial, 303 JAMA 6, 519–26 (2010) (describing a study using the Lap-Band in 
which the participants had a BMI of 35 or higher, but did not necessarily have a comorbidity). 
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potential off-label users. Fifth, the Lap-Band treats obesity and 
related comorbidities, including type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, 
high cholesterol, and obstructive sleep apnea, which are serious 
conditions. Sixth, unlike traditional and irreversible bariatric 
surgeries, the Lap-Band procedure is reversible. 
Our framework suggests that the FDA may have been too 
cautious with its initial approval of Lap-Band—which limited the 
device to patients with a BMI of 40, or 35 with one or more severe 
comorbid conditions. Off-label use for a lower BMI is along a 
continuous variable; absent data suggesting a sudden shift in 
outcomes between a BMI of 34 and 35, there is not necessarily a 
strong theoretical justification for that cutoff. Further, this off-label 
use is occurring in the “hump” of the distribution. The extrapolation 
population size of off-label users is sufficiently large to ensure a 
vibrant dataset for postmarket data collection. As opposed to 
conventional irreversible surgeries, in the event postmarket data 
revealed unexpected risks related to Lap-Band, the device could be 
removed. Our framework suggests that the Lap-Band could have 
been initially approved for either its 2011 indication, namely patients 
with a BMI of 30 to 34 presenting the highest risk of obesity-related 
complications, or its 2013 indications, namely patients with a BMI of 
30 to 40 with at least one obesity-related comorbidity. Our framework 
would also put a higher burden on manufacturers to conduct 
postmarket studies in these populations. The FDA could have 
approved the device for lower BMIs as conditional off-label uses, 
subject to the product sponsor completing its PMR according to 
agreed-upon timelines. 
Extrapolation from more comprehensive data on off-label use 
might have permitted earlier expansion of Lap-Band indications and 
earlier approval of the Realize Band. Approval of the Lap-Band for a 
lower BMI would have allowed more patients to benefit at an earlier 
stage of obesity. Approval of the Realize Band at an early stage might 
also have lowered healthcare costs by facilitating competition. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued for an evolutionary approach to drug and 
medical device regulation. Our goal has been to move evidence-based 
policymaking toward Bayesianism. At its most fundamental level, 
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Bayes’ Law is the science of learning.254 To apply Bayesian 
decisionmaking, one needs to form a prior belief based on existing 
evidence, gather additional information, and then update the prior 
belief.255 Our proposals are Bayesian because they force policymakers 
to assess and acknowledge the imperfect nature of their prior beliefs; 
gather, when cost-effective, additional information; and take action in 
terms of approvals, reimbursements, and enforcement based on 
continual updating. This Article advocates putting Bayesianism into 
regulatory practice. 
Although we have focused our attention on FDA regulations, 
our evolutionary evidence-based approach to policymaking has 
application to virtually any area of government decisionmaking. For 
example, the National Transportation Safety Board has 
recommended that states consider a kind of criminal-law 
extrapolation that would expand the scope of Driving Under the 
Influence (DUI) liability by lowering the blood-alcohol level that 
would trigger a criminal violation.256 In fact, one can imagine DUI 
extrapolations that would be directly analogous to the four forms of 
medical extrapolation discussed above. First, “diagnosis 
extrapolation” occurs when the coverage (elements) of a crime are 
expanded to punish related behaviors (for example, expanding DUI 
laws to cover different blood-alcohol levels or to cover additional 
drugs). Second, “patient extrapolation” occurs when the coverage 
(elements) of a crime are expanded to punish a new population (for 
example, expanding DUI laws to cover younger drivers). Third, 
“dosage extrapolation” occurs when the punishments’ durations are 
changed (for example, altering the DUI punishment by changing the 
length of incarceration or suspending licenses). Finally, “treatment 
extrapolation” occurs when the punishments are changed to related 
kinds of interventions (for example, changing the content of 
mandatory driver-education classes, or the conditions of 
imprisonment or supervised release). Any legal reform that 
extrapolates the size of a mandate, the class to which it applies, or the 
consequences of noncompliance, might be ripe for our evolutionary 
evidence-based approach. 
 
 254. See JACKMAN, supra note 11. 
 255. See Simon Jackman, Bayesian Analysis for Political Research, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
483, 483 (2004); see also JACKMAN, supra note 11. 
 256. NAT’L TRANS. SAFETY BD., REACHING ZERO: ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE ALCOHOL-
IMPAIRED DRIVING (May 14, 2013), http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2013/SR1301.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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Just as the FDA sometimes requires drug testing before 
regulatory approval, lawmakers at times should test legal reforms 
before enactment. Indeed, one of us has argued that we should 
sometimes “randomize law”—that is, lawmakers should conduct 
randomized controlled trials to assess the causal impact of legal 
reform before adopting a reform on a permanent basis.257 But at other 
times, the urgency of the present precludes gathering all relevant 
evidence before enactment. In such circumstances, evidentiary 




 257. See Ian Ayres, Yair J. Listokin & Michael Abramowicz, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 929, 1005 (2011) (“Randomized experimentation offers a powerful means to evaluate 
the effects of proposed policies. By applying laws and policies to different groups on a random 
basis, the causal impacts of the law can be isolated from other factors that would ordinarily be 
correlated with exposure to different policies.”); see also Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Throw 
Away the Jail or Throw Away the Key?: The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social 
Cost 1 (June 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2014/de-
figueiredo.pdf) (examining “the effectiveness of . . . sanctions in curbing recidivism and vehicle 
crashes with some 200,000 alcohol tests”). 
